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ABSTRACT 
The microfinance programme initiated by the Grameen Bank has 
become a model of lending to the poor and is now part of the global anti-
poverty strategy. The present study examines the corporate governance 
practices of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh including the 
Grameen Bank based on a survey of 36 MFIs constituting almost 90 per 
cent of the borrowers in Bangladesh in 2008. 
The corporate governance structure of the Grameen Bank is based 
on stakeholder value maximization model. Majority of the board members 
(9 out of 13) are from the borrower groups - the biggest stakeholder of the 
bank. However, most of the representatives of the borrowers (mostly 
women) possess very little education so as to function effectively and 
independently in a board setting. The government which regulates and 
provides capital to the Grameen Bank (indirectly through Bangladesh 
Bank) controls the appointment of the CEO and the Chairman of the 
Board of the Grameen Bank although it is a minority shareholder (10 per 
cent of the equity). Thus, the board of the Grameen Bank is compliant to 
the government and lacks the independent character which is crucial to the 
conduct and performance of the bank. The empirical analysis based on the 
data for 36 MFIs in Bangladesh show that corporate governance variables 
are significant in explaining the performance of MFI's in Bangladesh. 
Among the corporate governance variables, the board composition 
variable reflecting the independence of the board seems to have a positive 
and significant impact on the performance of MFI's in Bangladesh. The 
absence of statistical significance of other corporate governance variables 
like auditor independence can be explained in terms of lack of quality 
data and the evolving nature of microfinance industry in Bangladesh. 
JEL classification: G30, G32, J23 
Key words: Microfinance, Governance, Boards, Audit. 
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Chapter I : 
Introduction 
The concept of micro-credit— the extension of small loans without 
any collateral, based on joint liability— was pioneered by Dr. Muhammad 
Yunus in 1976 in Bangladesh. The remarkable outreach of this movement 
in Bangladesh (which presently covers not only credit but also a number 
of financial and non-financial services) has shown that extending credit 
and financial services to the poor is feasible and profitable. The access of 
the poor to credit is recognized as an important strategy in achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of promoting gender equality, 
women's empowerment and poverty reduction. The World Development 
Report of 2000/2001 widely recommended the microcredit for poverty 
reduction and as a social safety net for the poor of the developing 
countries (World Development Report 2001). As of end of December 
2006, it had served more than 465 million poorest family members 
(mostly by providing savings accounts) and extended credit to more than 
133 million borrowers (Microcredit Summit Report 2007). Micro finance 
is high on the public agenda after the UN Year of Microcredit in 2005 and 
the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dr. Yunus and the Grameen 
Bank' in 2006. 
1
 Grameen Bank was a project under Bangladesh Bank from 1976 to 1983. A government 
ordinance in September 1983 transformed the project into an independent bank. In 1983 
Government of Bangladesh owned 60% of the equity capital of Grameen Bank and 40% 
2 
In Bangladesh, the growth of microfinance has been under, 
broadly, two institutional structures—as a bank (like Grameen Bank) or as 
a microfinance institution (MFI). The Grameen Bank is a specialized 
microfinance bank originated exclusively for providing credit and related 
services to the poor. It provides credit and other financial services to the 
poor, encourages them to save so that they can buy a share of the bank, 
and provides institutional support (training and counseling) for efficient 
use of loans. 
In addition, the microfinance institution (MFI), also like Grameen 
Bank but under a different institutional framework, provides financial and 
non-financial services to the poor.2 Among the MFIs, three institutions 
identified as very large are the Association for Social Advancement 
(ASA), Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and 
Proshika. Each has more than one million borrowers. The Association for 
Social Advancement's (ASA) total borrowers as of June 2006 was 4.6 
million and its outstanding loan disbursement was US$293 million; the 
BRAC's borrowers was US$4.6 million and outstanding loan 
disbursements were US$350 million; and the Proshika Manbik Unnayan 
Kendro's borrowers were 1.6 million and its outstanding loan 
disbursement was US$54 million (Microcredit Regulatory Authority 
were owned by borrowers. Now borrowers/shareholders subscribe to 90% of equity 
capital and the share of Government of Bangladesh is only 10%, see www.grameen.com. 
2
 For an overview of microfinance movement in Bangladesh, see Khandker 1998; 
Rahman 1993, 1996, 2004; Yunus 1999; Zaman et al. 2007. 
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Report 2006). At the end of December 2006, in Bangladesh, the overall 
cumulative borrowers of MFIs were 31 million and their cumulative loan 
disbursement was US$8,053 million (Credit and Development Forum 
Report 2006). At the same time, Grameen Bank's members were 6.9 
million and cumulative loan disbursement was US$5,751 million 
(Grameen Bank at www.grameen-info.com). 
Although the Grameen Bank and the MFIs were initially 
dependent on external resources (grants and soft loans), they are now large 
profit-making institutions. The Grameen Bank made US$20 million profit 
in 2006 (Grameen Bank at www.grameen-info.com). Moreover, in recent 
years the MFIs have increasingly accessed commercial sources of finance 
to scale up their operations and used the poor (at the bottom of the 
pyramid) to enhance their profits (Zaman et al. 2007; Prahalad 2008). 
The main challenge of micro finance is to create social benefits and 
promote financial inclusion by providing financial services to low-income 
households. This is often referred to as the "double-bottom line" of MFIs 
(Tulchin 2003). The increasing emphasis in recent years on financial 
sustainability rather than on social mission has led to allegations of 
"mission drift" among MFIs (Armendariz and Szafarz 2009). It is in this 
context that the issue of governance of MFIs becomes increasingly 
relevant. The term "governance" has a wide connotation: it broadly refers 
4 
to the functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic 
activity (Williamson 2005; Dixit 2009). However, in the context of 
Grameen Bank and MFIs, we are more concerned with corporate 
governance issues than economic governance issues. In the corporate 
governance literature, under the 'shareholder approach,' the emphasis is 
on value creation for the shareholder only. Corporate governance 
theorizing is dominated by the agency theory approach3. Under the 
'stakeholder approach,' however, the interests of all partners (including 
borrowers) are given equal importance4. 
In the microfinance industry, the practice has superseded the 
theoretical developments and the industry has reached a cross-road where 
one cannot ignore the other. Given these developments, a study of the 
corporate governance of Grameen Bank and MFIs is important for the 
following reasons: (1) the microfinance community has experienced some 
major failures because of inadequacies in its operation, including 
corporate governance (Labie 2001). (2) Given its tremendous outreach in 
recent years, its future growth and sustainability depends on how it is 
governed— the institutional framework (board), legal framework, 
transparency, etc. (3) To attract further fresh capital into this industry 
requires a thorough understanding of the corporate governance practices 
3
 For a review of literature on the topic, see, Fama and Jensen 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 
1997. 
4
 The coipoiate governance models embedded in these two broader approaches include 
managenal, labour and state-oriented models. 
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of MFIs. This is especially relevant in the case of the recent trends to 
attract investment funds by MFIs. The investment funds demand 
involvement in governance of the MFIs in which they invest equity 
capital. (4) Microfinance institutions have certain objectives like "double 
bottom-line" which require considerable trade-offs between profitability 
and social mission. The main objective of the present study is to 
understand the governance of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh for long-term institutional sustainability 
from the perspective of best practices in corporate governance. For this 
study, the primary data of corporate governance indicators of MFIs and 
Grameen Bank has been collected through a primary survey. The closer 
examination of governance includes an outline of the roles of the board 
members, board composition, and an explanation of the important issues 
of trust and conflicts of interest. 
The thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 reviews the literature 
on corporate governance structures and formulates the hypothesis for the 
study, while chapter 3 traces the evolution of the MFI in Bangladesh and 
its proposed microfinance regulations, and provides a current overview of 
the sector in Bangladesh. In chapter 4, the data sample for the study is 
discussed; it also explains the methodology used in the empirical 
investigation. Chapter 5 analyses the corporate governance structure of 
Grameen Bank, the composition of its board, and the effectiveness of its 
6 
governance structure. An analysis of the corporate governance and 
empirical result of MFI occurs in chapter 6, and in chapter 7 the 
concluding chapter, concluding observations on the corporate governance 
of MFIs in Bangladesh are available. 
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Chapter II: 
Corporate Governance and Microfinance Institutions- A 
Review of the Literature 
The study of corporate governance has assumed greater importance 
in recent years with issues such as 'transparency,' 'managerial 
accountability,' 'corporate governance failures,' 'weak board of directors,' 
'protection of minority shareholders,' 'investor activism,' 'executive 
compensation.' These phrases have become household phrases and have 
attracted considerable attention in the current debate on corporate failures 
and reforms. In recent times, it has been increasingly recognized that 
some companies in certain sectors (including microfinance institutions) 
have violated their social contract with consumers, shareholders, 
regulators and the community at large. In a March 2009, a McKinsey 
Quarterly survey of senior executives around the world found that 85 
percent of them believed that public trust is the main issue and that the 
commitment to free markets had deteriorated (Bonini et al. 2009). 
According to another survey in 2009 by Edelman Trust, 62 percent of 
respondents across 20 countries feel that they "trust corporations less now 
than they did a year ago" (Bonini et al. 2009). Similarly, the failure of big 
corporations like Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers, among others, 
has brought into focus the role of corporate governance in company 
performance. 
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The question foremost in the minds of practitioners is what 
constitutes good corporate governance. The dominant view is that 
corporate governance relates to the ways in which the suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Becht et al. 2002). This is a narrow view of 
corporate governance and many commentators believe that stakeholders, 
such as employees, communities, suppliers or customers also have a 
significant role in how value (profit) is internalized in a firm. 
The classic work by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) discuss the issue of separation of ownership and control 
and its consequences. The initial debate occurred with regard to a firm's 
objective under Shareholder Wealth Maximization (SWM) and the 
Stakeholder Capitalism Model (SCM) and how the various incentive 
mechanisms could be used to align the interests of various constituents in 
a firm (Shleifer and Vishney 1997). The microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
which have evolved in Bangladesh and various countries face unique 
challenges because they must achieve a 'double bottom line'- provide 
financial services to the poor (financial inclusion) as well as create social 
benefits. This brings into focus how effective governance is critical to the 
success of MFIs (Champion 1998; Rock et al. 1998; Hartarska 2005). This 
chapter reviews the literature on corporate governance and in particular its 
relevance for MFIs. The chapter is organized into seven sections. Section 
9 
2.1 briefly summarizes the theoretical debate on Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization (SWM) vs. Stakeholder Capitalism Model (SCM) and the 
corporate governance issue in SWM and SCM, with section 2.2 briefly 
discussing the international codes on corporate governance. Section 2.3 
addresses the debate on corporate governance with regard to MFIs, and 
section 2.4 discusses the corporate governance literature and hypothesis 
development. A summary of corporate governance in Bangladesh is 
summarized in section 2.5. Finally section 2.6 summarizes the conclusions 
of this chapter. 
2.1: Goals of Shareholder Wealth Maximization (SWM) Vs. 
Stakeholder Capitalism Model (SCM). 
Creating value or franchise value has always been the goal of 
corporate policy. The Anglo-American markets have a philosophy that a 
firm's objective should follow Shareholder Wealth Maximization (SWM) 
while the non-Anglo-American markets emphasize the Stakeholder 
Capitalism Model (SCM). This model requires multiple goals and involves 
a number of trade-offs. 
Firms under SWM emphasize maximizing return to shareholders, 
as measured by the sum of capital gains and dividends for a given level of 
risk. This model assumes that the stock market is efficient and that stock 
price reflects the shareholder value. The classical dilemma involved in the 
10 
SWM model is the separation of ownership and control and its 
consequences. The agency theory casts this problem in terms of the 
principal-agent problem- a principal must delegate a task to an agent 
whose incentives are not perfectly aligned with those of the principal. The 
solution of the agency theory makes its case in terms of how shareholders 
can motivate management through incentive mechanisms like bonus; stock 
options, etc., to think like shareholders. However, the high-profile 
scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and so on, and the recent 
failure of investment banks like Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns has 
brought into focus the importance of corporate governance in a well-
functioning market economy. 
The dissatisfaction with SWM led to the view that a corporation 
should serve a larger social purpose and be responsible. In some markets 
(for example, the developing world), the shareholders also strive to 
maximize long-term returns to equity and takes into consideration the 
constraint imposed by other stakeholders like labor unions, local 
communities, creditors, environment, and so on. This model has been 
labeled the stakeholder capitalism model (SCM). In other words, it 
advocates reaching out to other stakeholders and not only to shareholders. 
It argues that 'stakeholding' makes commercial sense. The SCM does not 
assume that stock markets are either efficient or inefficient, but assumes 
that long-term 'loyal' shareholders (typically controlling shareholders) 
11 
should influence corporate strategy rather than the transient portfolio 
investor. 
The traditional question of corporate governance relates to the 
question of goal of corporate management. In the SWM, the overriding 
objective is the maximization over time of the returns to shareholders. In 
order to achieve this, good governance practices should focus on internal 
and external forces which affect the functioning of a firm. Chart 2.1 
provides an overview of the various parties and their responsibilities 
associated with the governance of a firm. 
12 
Chart 2.1: The Structure of Corporate Governance 
The Marketplace (External) 
The Corporation (Internal) 
Board of Directors 
Management 
Equity Market 
Debt Markets 
Auditors and Legal 
Advisers 
Regulators 
Corporate governance represents the relationship among stakeholdeis that is 
used to determine and contiol the stiategic duection and perfoiTnance of the 
organization 
Source Moffett, Stonehill and Eiteman 2009 37 
The question of what constitutes a good governance structure is 
strongly debated One of the widely-accepted statements of good corporate 
governance practices is that established by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2004) Table 2 1 lists some of the 
commonly listed indicators of good corporate governance, and section 2 2 
13 
discusses some of the widely used corporate governance codes around the 
world. 
Table 2.1: Indicators of Good Corporate Governance 
Accountability 
Transparent Ownership 
Board Size (5 to 9) 
Board Accountability 
Ownership Neutrality 
Independence 
Dispersed Ownership 
Independent Audits and 
Oversights 
Independent Directors 
Disclosure and Transparency 
Board, timely, and Accurate 
Disclosure 
Internationally Recognized 
Accounting Standard 
Shareholder Equality 
One Share, One Vote 
Source: Newell and Wilson 2002: 21. 
2.2: International Corporate Governance Codes 
Although there is no universal model of corporate governance, 
with the collapse of corporations, changing patterns of ownership, and 
varying cultural and societal values, the corporate governance codes have 
varied widely (Reaz and Hossain 2007). Sixty-two countries currently 
have a corporate governance code (Hunt 2008). Table 2.2 reports some of 
the recent codes of corporate governance, also showing that independent 
14 
directors are recommended in almost all of the countries' corporate codes. 
In addition, separation of chairman-CEO roles occurs and reporting to the 
board is required semi-annually. 
Table 2.2: Some Recent Codes of Governance 
Country/Code Independent Separation of Rotation of Frequency of 
Directors Chairman-CEO External Financial 
roles Auditors? Reporting 
Brazil(CVM 
Code-2002) 
France (Bouton 
Report-2002) 
Russia (CG Code-
2002) 
Singapore (CG 
Committee-2001) 
United Kingdom 
(Cadbury Code-
1992) 
United Kingdom 
(Combined Code 
- 2003) 
United States 
(Conference 
Board - 2003) 
As many as 
possible 
At least one 
half of board 
At least one 
quarter of the 
board. 
At least one-
third of the 
board. 
Majority of 
non-
executive 
directors 
At least one 
half of the 
board. 
Substantial 
Majority of 
Board 
Clear preference 
for split 
No 
recommendation 
Split required 
bylaw 
Recommended. 
Recommended 
Clear preference 
for split. 
Separation is 
one of the three 
acceptable 
options 
Not covered 
Regularly, for 
lead auditors 
Not covered 
Periodically 
for lead 
auditors 
Periodically, 
for lead 
auditors 
Not covered. 
Recommended 
for audit firm 
Quarterly 
No 
recommendation 
given. 
Quarterly. 
Semi-annually. 
Semi-annually. 
Semi-annually, 
per listing rules 
Quarterly, as 
required by law. 
Source: Coombes and Wong 2004: 52. 
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2.3: Corporate Governance and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
The term of corporate governance in the context of microfinance 
first appeared in the literature in 1997 (Lapenu and Pierret 2006) and 
usually refers to the relationship between the board of directors and the 
management of MFIs. The main challenge of microfinance is to create 
social benefits and promote financial inclusion by providing financial 
services to low-income households. It is in this context that the issue of 
corporate governance of MFIs becomes increasingly relevant. Under the 
SWM approach, the emphasis is on value creation for the shareholder 
only. However, in the SCM approach, the interests of all partners 
(including borrowers) are given equal importance. In the microfinance 
industry, it is SCM that has close proximity to the practice. However, in 
the microfinance industry, the practice has superseded the theoretical 
developments and the industry has reached the point where one cannot 
ignore the other. Given these developments, a study of corporate 
governance of microfinance institutions is important. 
Very few studies on the impact of governance mechanisms of 
MFIs on the dual missions of financial sustainability and social benefits 
exist (Hartarska 2005; Mersland and Strom 2009). Hartarska (2005) 
investigates the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
financial and outreach performance, using three surveys of rated and 
16 
unrated East European MFIs between 1998 and 2002. Governance 
mechanism includes board characteristics, CEO compensation and 
ownership type (shareholder-owned firms, cooperatives, etc.). Hartarska 
(2005) finds that a more independent board gives a better return on the 
assets (ROA) of MFI's in Eastern Europe. The study also finds that a 
board with employee directors results in lower financial performance and 
outreach. 
The study by Mersland and Strom (2009) based on a global 
dataset of 278 MFIs from 60 countries collected from rating agencies 
found that financial performance improves with local rather than 
international directors, an internal board auditor and a female CEO. Given 
the debate on the impact on corporate governance of MFI's on its 
performance, the following section broadly sets the hypothesis for 
empirical investigation. 
2.4: Corporate Governance Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Considering the agency problem and double bottom line of MFIs, 
an effective board of directors is an important component of their 
corporate governance. As well, the microfinance governance literature 
also recognizes the need of the internal governance (board) mechanism for 
good governance (Rock et al. 1998; Otero and Chu 2002; Helms 2006; 
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Labie 2001). The board effectiveness is determined by its monitoring 
function, independence, size, and composition, gender composition, CEO 
experience, internal board auditor, external auditor, ownership; external 
mechanisms such as product market competition and regulation are also 
important (John and Senbet 1998; Mersland and Storm 2009; Hartarska 
2005; Rock et al. 1998; Labie 2001; Kim and Nofsinger 2007). Given that 
the size of the board does have some bearing on performance, the first 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
HI: There is a significant relationship between board size and 
corporate performance. 
The literature suggests that a small board would be better for 
effective monitoring of the management and CEO (Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Kim and Nofsinger 2007; John and Senbet 1998). Empirical evidence 
from the study of Monks and Minow (1995) suggests that the size of board 
does matter (cited in Haniffa and Hudaib 2006) and Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) have also argued that a small board is more effective. They 
recommended a board with eight or nine members (cited in Haniffa and 
Hudaib 2006). An empirical study of a sample of 792 companies by 
Yermack (1996), as well, suggests that a smaller board brings better 
performance than a larger one. Eisenberg et al. (1998) found similar 
patterns using sample of small and midsize Finnish firms. 
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In contrast, Holthausen and Larcker's (1993) study did not find 
any relationship between the board size and performance (cited in Haniffa 
and Hudaib 2006). Moreover, Bohren and Storm (2005) report that larger 
boards are associated with lower firm performance. However, Pfeffer 
(1987), Pearce and Zahra (1992), and Goodstein et al. (1994) reported that 
a bigger board may be effective because it might be able to provide the 
board with diverse opinions and resources (cited in Haniffa and Hudaib 
2006). 
H2: There is a significant relationship between board composition 
and performance 
The board effectiveness in its monitoring function is determined by 
its independence, size and composition. If a board has more outsiders 
(other than managers), it is considered to be more independent. Corporate 
governance in America has increasingly shifted towards independent 
boards with a majority outside board members (John and Senbet 1998). 
Bhagat and Black (1997) have reported that 50 percent of the 100 
American public corporations surveyed in 1996 had only one or two inside 
directors (cited in John and Senbet 1998). It has also been suggested that 
boards dominated by outsider (independent) or non-executive directors 
may help to reduce the agency problem (Berle and Means 1932; 
Wiliamson 1985; and Jensen and Meckling 1976). Such boards may help 
in reducing management consumption and removing non-performing 
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CEOs and other personnel (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Pearce and Zahra 
(1992) have argued that if the majority of board members are outsiders, 
then their deliberations and decisions provide better strategic directions 
which ultimately improve performance (cited in Haniffa and Hudaib 
2006). 
The empirical evidence of board composition on corporate 
governance is mixed. Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) study found that 
corporations in America with a majority of active independent boards 
perform much better than those of passive, non-independent boards (cited 
in Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). In contrast, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
found a significant negative relationship between board outsiders and 
performance (cited in Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). 
An independent board is very important for the governance of 
MFIs. There is considerable consensus in the literature that when a board 
has a higher fraction of non-insiders/independent directors it becomes 
more effective at monitoring management (Kim and Nofsinger 2007). 
Moreover, in MFIs, if the CEO and the chairman are different person then 
the board can be more effective (Mersland and Storm 2007). Oxelheim 
and Randoy (2003) also found that firm performance was improved when 
the directors were independent. 
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The gender of CEO and gender composition of the Board 
(especially with regard to MFI) could have considerable impact on the 
performance of the firm (Mersland and Storm 2009). Almost 90 percent 
members of MFIs are women. Having a female CEO or a good number of 
board members as women can help the MFIs to understand their 
customers better. This better understanding of customers would influence 
its performance positively (Mersland and Storm 2009). 
H3: There is a significant relationship between auditor's 
independence and performance 
Another important variable crucial to the governance mechanism is 
the internal board auditor. The internal auditor oversee the firm's financial 
and operating procedures, checks the accuracy of the financial record 
keeping, and ensures compliance with accounting regulations (Kim and 
Nofsinger 2007). The internal board auditor provides an independent, 
objective assessment of the organization's internal governance structure 
and the operating effectiveness of the management of MFIs (Mersland and 
Storm 2009). Policy papers regarding MFIs stress the importance of the 
internal auditor and its direct reporting to the MFI board (Steinwand 
2000). A study by Mersland and Storm (2009) shows that when auditor's 
report directly to the board, a higher financial performance can be 
expected. 
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A number of other hypotheses are embedded in the corporate 
governance literature. Given the fact that these hypotheses are less 
relevant at the present time to the performance of MFIs, they are left to 
future research. The above-mentioned hypotheses will be examined in the 
empirical chapter in the context of MFI's in Bangladesh. 
2.5: Corporate Governance in Bangladesh 
Corporate sector development in Bangladesh is still in its 
rudimentary stage. Most of the companies depend on the banks as 
financing sources. Bangladesh still follows the hybrid legal system 
inherited from the British administration. Corporate governance practices 
in Bangladesh started occupying attention only after its independence in 
1972. The legal framework for the conduct of firms in Bangladesh was 
based on the Companies Act of 1913 and the Securities and Exchange 
Ordinance of 1969. After independence, the Bangladesh Bank Order of 
1972, the Bank Companies Act of 1991, the Financial Institutions Act of 
1993, the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1993, and the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1997 were enacted. Currently, the Companies Act of 
1994 provides the legal framework for the conduct of the incorporated 
Domestic Corporation and institutions in Bangladesh. 
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The Companies Act of 1994 provides framework for the audit, 
preparation and publication of financial statements and disclosure. This act 
provides certain supervisory functions of the shareholders, such as 
attending meetings, appointment and removal of directors, and 
dissemination of financial information and balance sheet (Bhuiyan and 
Biswas 2007). The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
promulgated different guidelines and notifications to ensure good 
corporate governance in the listed public companies. However, the 
compliance with these guidelines and notifications leaves much to be 
desired (Bhuiyan and Biswas 2007). Most of the regulatory agencies (like 
SEC) suffer from a shortage of qualified staff/expertise. For example, 
there is only one full-time corporate accountant working at the agency 
(Reaz and Arun 2006). 
The Bangladesh Bank (central bank of Bangladesh) is the primary 
regulator for the financial system (including MFIs). The Bangladesh Bank 
is fully owned by the central government. It lacks trained quality staff in 
terms of prudent monitoring and supervision of the financial system (Reaz 
and Arun 2006). In addition, political interventions, lack of quality and 
corruption undermine the capacity of regulators to play an effective role in 
corporate governance (Reaz and Arun 2006). 
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According to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh's (ICAB) mandate, it is the supreme authority for affiliation 
and regulation of accountants in Bangladesh. It has published a report on 
Corporate Governance in Bangladesh in 2003, which provides guidelines 
to improve the corporate governance in Bangladesh. However, ICAB has 
failed to design effective regulations and train professional accountants to 
achieve international accounting standards in Bangladesh (Reaz and Arun 
2006). 
Although there are limited regulatory frameworks, in many cases 
the current system does not provide sufficient legal, institutional or 
economic motivation for stakeholders to encourage and enforce good 
corporate governance practice. A study by the Bangladesh Enterprise 
Institute (2003) has reported that there is no reward or penalties for 
practicing good governance or not following good corporate governance 
practices (Bhuiyan and Biswas 2007). A study by Mazumder (2006) also 
reported that most of the businesses are owned by family and there are 
lack a of delegation of power to other officials, a lack of independent 
internal audit and a lack of professionalism, which may have contributed 
to the poor corporate governance in Bangladesh (cited in Bhuiyan and 
Biswas 2007). As the literature suggests, the corporate governance in 
Bangladesh is in its nascent stage and evolving. 
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As regards the framework for the conduct of non-government 
organizations to which most of the MFIs belong, there are virtually no 
guidelines. The NGOs operating MFIs (NGO-MFIs) in Bangladesh do not 
have to fulfill any extra terms and conditions or regulations for operating 
microcredit programs in Bangladesh (Khaled 2001). The MFIs carry out 
financial intermediation by mobilizing savings and extending 
microfinance to their members. They are like quasi-banks, but not 
controlled by banking laws and regulations of the country. In recent years 
the government's concerns have grown significantly with the increasing 
size, outreach and savings deposits of MFIs operations. In 1997 active 
members of MFIs were 6.74 million; this increased to 20.51millions in 
2006, in less than a decade. In 1997, whereas outstanding borrowers were 
only 4.26 million, it increased rapidly and in 2006 it was 16 million. The 
cumulative disbursement of the MFIs in 1997 was US$968 million which 
increased to US$7948 million in 2006. These facts indicate the 
tremendous growth of the sector in Bangladesh, which emphasizes the 
need for better corporate governance practices among these institutions. 
However, in the early stages of the development of MFIs, they 
depended on low-cost funds from donors. During the 1980s, the donors 
began to fund on a large scale to the organizations, such as BRAC, the 
Grameen Bank, RDRS, ASA, and Proshika. Now these are the largest 
MFIs in Bangladesh. Foreign grants to the MFIs averaged $ 160 million 
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annually in the first half of the 1990s and have grown to US$ 255 million 
annually since then (Zaman et. al. 2007). These MFIs depended on donors 
100 percent. For example, from the beginning, BRAC was 100 percent 
subsidized by donors and its expenditure from the beginning to 1985 was 
100 percent contributed by the donors; even in 2006 it was almost 30 
percent (BRAC Annual Report 2006). In the case of Grameen Bank, in 
1992 more than 99 percent of its funding came from foreign donors. AT 
present these low-cost funds have diminished. Therefore, the big MFIs, 
like BRAC, ASA, and Grameen Bank are increasingly accessing 
international capital. That is why corporate governance aspects are 
increasingly relevant today for the conduct and performance of MFIs in 
Bangladesh. 
Table 2.3: Present Reporting System of MFIs in Bangladesh 
Law Dealing Authority 
Societies Registration Act of 1860, Joint Stock Companies 
Companies Act 1913/1994 as a non-
profit Companies 
Voluntary Social Welfare Ordinance Social Welfare Ministry 
of 1961 
Foreign Contribution Ordinance of NGO Affairs Bureau (Under this law no 
1962, Foreign Donations Regulation organization can be formed, it gives the 
Ordinance of 1978 permission for foreign fund) 
Trust Act of 1882 Ministry of Law 
Some are enlisted under Dept. of Family 
Planning, Youth Development and others 
Source: Rashid 2005:11. 
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Presently, in the NGO-MFIs sectors, there are no specific 
regulatory or corporate governance guidelines in Bangladesh. Twelve 
different laws for MFIs registration in Bangladesh exists (discussed in 
chapter 3). These laws do not require submitting robust reporting, auditing 
or disclosure. For example, the Societies Registration Act of 1860 requires 
an annual meeting but does not require submission of annual accounts or 
audits. The Trust Act of 1882 requires maintenance of accounts but not 
external audits (Zaman et al. 2007). The Company Acts (1913, 1994) 
require book keeping, audit and report-filing, but the Registrar of Joint 
Stock Companies is unable to enforce these requirements (Zaman et al. 
2007). In addition, the Bangladesh NGO Affairs Bureau is the primary 
regulator, because most of the NGO-MFIs who are getting foreign 
donations or aid must register with the bureau. However, the NGO Affairs 
Bureau does not actively use its power against non-compliance (Zaman et 
al. 2007). 
Therefore, the financial management practice of MFIs in 
Bangladesh is shaped by donor requirements and the absence of coherent 
and uniform accounting standards within regulations. As a result, there is 
no specific governance structure. It is in this context that the corporate 
governance of MFIs becomes important as it is vital for their sustainability 
and poverty alleviation in Bangladesh. 
2.6: Conclusion 
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Considering the importance of the fulfillment of the dual missions 
of MFIs, there are limited studies on MFIs governance of Bangladesh. 
This chapter has reviewed the broad contours of theoretical and empirical 
literature on the various facets of corporate governance and highlighted 
some important hypotheses for empirical investigation in Bangladesh. 
The literature on MFI governance suggests that the microfinance 
governance depends on the interaction between the board, managers and 
borrowers of the MFIs. From that perspective, three dimensions of 
governance (horizontal, vertical and external dimensions) are suggested in 
the literature. The literature suggests that governance is important for the 
financial performance of microfinance institutions and the hypotheses 
earmarked for empirical verification are: (i) that there is a significant 
relationship between board size and corporate performance of MFIs; (ii) 
that there is a significant relationship between board composition and 
performance of MFIs; and (iii) that there is a significant relationship 
between the auditor's independence and the performance of MFIs. These 
hypotheses will be tested in the empirical chapter. 
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Chapter III: 
Evolution of Microfinance in Bangladesh: 1971 - 2008. 
Bangladesh has had a colorful political history. Part of the 
undivided Bengal province during the colonial period, during the partition 
(1947) it became the part of Pakistan called East Pakistan. It attained 
political independence in 1971 after a prolonged and disruptive liberation 
struggle. After independence in 1971, the country had to confront a 
massive displacement of population and faced the challenges of providing 
relief and rehabilitation to the vast majority of the population. Along with 
governmental efforts, there were efforts by a number of non-government 
agencies (like Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) to provide 
relief and rehabilitation of the displaced and improve their livelihood. 
The Grameen Bank, which won the Nobel peace prize in 2006 and 
was the model of lending to the poor and, as an anti-poverty strategy, 
emulated in many parts of the world, was created and nurtured in 
Bangladesh. The chapter traces the evolution of the microfinance industry 
in Bangladesh since its independence in 1971. The chapter is divided into 
five sections: section 3.1 provides an overview of the rural credit delivery 
mechanism in Bangladesh; section 3.2 traces the evolution of 
microfinance in Bangladesh; section 3.3 offers an analysis of the program 
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of micro finance in Bangladesh; section 3.4 discusses the current legal and 
regulatory framework of micro finance institutions (MFIs); and section 3.5 
provides the conclusion. 
3.1: An Overview of Rural Credit Delivery Mechanisms in 
Bangladesh (Before and After the Independence in 1971) 
3.1.1: The Role of Moneylender in the Rural Credit 
The undivided Bengal province was dominated by informal credit, 
especially by the money lenders. The people of ancient Bengal had 
experienced exploitation from moneylenders even before 400 BC; 
reference to this phenomenon is found in Koutilya's Artha Shastra. The 
credit system in the Indian sub-continent (undivided Bengal province) 
gained substantial strength during the Mughal period (1526-1858) when 
gold coins were in use which facilitated money-lending activities (Azad 
1993). 
The rural credit system in Bengal is closely linked with agriculture. 
In the early eighteenth century, mahajans (moneylenders) advanced 
money to the rural peasants before the season for grains production. They 
accepted grain as repayment and stored it until a profitable market period. 
The interest rate was embedded in the grain and repayment was very high. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the peasants were provided loans 
by merchants and landlords (Azad 1993). Thus, the credit market, 
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especially the informal credit market, was interwoven with the agriculture 
tenure system. 
The then British government, considering the repression of 
peasants by local lenders (money lenders) established the Indian Central 
Banking Enquiry Committee to investigate, among other things, the 
agrarian lending practices in agriculture. The committee found malpractice 
in money lending. Money lenders took unfair advantage of the rural 
peasants who were illiterate, ignorant and helpless (Amaravati District 
Gazetteers; Borooah 1980). On the basis of the Committee's report, the 
finance department of the government made some suggestions to prevent 
the practice throughout India. The Bengal Money-Lenders Act of 1940 
was adopted to regulate the activities of the moneylenders. This was an 
important addition to other laws such as the Usurious Loans Act of 1918 
or the Bengal Moneylenders Act of 1933. According to the latter, interest 
in excess of 15 percent on secured loans and in excess of 20 percent on 
unsecured loans was declared illegal. --» 
Following independence from the British in 1947, Pakistan 
inherited a banking and credit structure from the British regime consisting 
of a host of formal and informal institutions. The formal-informal system 
constituted of 631 local and foreign bank offices. However, the presence 
of informal sources of credit was also noticeable in both provinces of 
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Pakistan (East & West). The share of the formal and informal credit 
markets in rural areas was 4.53 percent and 95.47 percent respectively in 
1956; 13.89 percent and 86.11 percent in 1966; 14 percent and 86 percent 
in 1974; and 25 percent and 75 percent in 1989. The average rate of 
interest on informal credit during the periods varied from 60 percent to 
110 percent per annum (Azad 1993) 
Table 3.1: Informal Credit in Bangladesh (Before and after the 
Independence) 
1956 1966 1974 
Informal credit of total market share (%) 95.5 86.1 86.0 
Formal credit of total market share (%) 4.5 13.9 14.0 
Source: Azad 1993. 
After independence in 1971, Bangladesh inherited a very weak 
credit and banking system. The informal segment was comprised of local 
moneylenders and merchants, shopkeepers, and other types of lenders, 
who were almost non-functional during the early years of independence 
due to the scarcity of loanable funds. Despite the increases in institutional 
components of the rural credit market in Bangladesh, non-institutional 
sources continued to remain as the major sources of rural credit (see Table 
3.2). 
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Table 3.2: Distribution Pattern of Rural Credit, by Landownership 
Group-1982 
Landownership Households Households 
Group (in receiving receiving 
acres) loans from loans from 
Institutional Informal 
Sources (%) Sources 
Loans Loans Share of 
obtained obtained total loans 
(households) (households) obtained 
from from from 
Institutional Institutional institutional 
Sources Sources sources (%) 
($US) ($US) 
6.8 
15.0 
Functionally 
landless 
(upto0.49) 
Small Owner 
(0.50-1.99) 
Medium owner 20.0 
(2.00-4.99) 
Large Owner 21.0 
(5.00 or more) 
All 
Households 
14.3 
91.6 
55.9 
46.9 
29.0 
61.7 
4.05 46.8 8.0 
11.30 
25.2 
46.45 
16.15 
42.05 
48.15 
74.65 
48.2 
21.2 
34.4 
38.4 
25.0 
Note: Exchange rate $US 1= 20 (BDTK.) 
Source: Hossain 1988: 22 
As is evident from Table 3.2, 62 percent of the rural households 
obtained loan in 1982 from moneylenders or the informal credit market. 
Nearly 92 percent of the functionally landless households were dependent 
on the informal market/moneylenders. In addition, in many cases the 
average rate of interest charged was estimated at 125 percent a year 
(Hossain 1988: 22). 
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3.1.2: The Role of Co-operatives in the Rural Credit 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the dadan (advance) loans 
to weavers, local farmers, and industrial producers were provided by 
merchants (foreign and domestic), landlords and companies for supplying 
a particular amount of goods within a particular period. The interest rate 
embedded in production-system agreements such as share-cropping was 
extraordinarily high (more than 100 percent). This was a source of concern 
to public authority. The Nobel laureate Rabidranath Tagore (1861-1941) 
came up with the idea of collateral free credit to rural peasants and 
established the Kalligram Krishi Bank in 1905 in the village of Patishar in 
the district of Naogaon in north-eastern Bengal province (now in 
Bangladesh). It was modeled on the basis of co-operative societies of 
England and other European countries. His rural co-operatives were 
started in 1914 and were community based and; they functioned until the 
1920s (Mondal 2002). Before that there was the Agricultural Loans Act of 
1885 set up by the British Government for 'Taccavi' loans in Bengal— 
loans for peasants affected by natural disasters. This system lasted until 
the 1970s. The loan was considered as a debt relief and repayment was not 
enforced by the government (Rutherford 1995). 
In 1904, undivided India's first Cooperative Societies Act was 
passed to provide a legal framework for the establishment of village-level, 
self-help, user-managed co-operative societies which mobilized the 
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society's personal savings. Moreover, the Agricultural Debtor's Act of 
1935 and the Money Lenders Act of 1939 were enacted to restrict the 
money lenders activity in the most credit system. The British government 
also amended the Cooperative Societies Act of 1940 and increased the 
number of loan mortgage banks to facilitate the availability of credit to the 
rural peasant (Nath 2004). Nevertheless, in thel930s, the cooperatives did 
not work well for a number of reasons. The illiteracy of the rural poor and 
peasant made it difficult to manage their schemes. The official character of 
the cooperative movement distanced it from the rural users. These users 
were controlled by wealthy and influential people in society and many 
members were engaged only for personal profit. The Money-Lenders Act 
of 1939 also gave a jolt to the societies because it defined co-operatives as 
money-lending agencies and imposed restrictions on them. 
Although the professional money lenders could evade the 
restrictions, the societies as an institution could not do that. In addition, 
the great depression of the 1930s put the agricultural sector in a position 
that resulted in the closure of many co-operatives (Rutherford 1995). 
Furthermore, the Second World War, the great famine in 1943 and the 
political and social upheaval of partition of the country in 1947 were 
further blows for the co-operatives. At the time of partition, there were 
26,664 agricultural credit societies in East Pakistan and many of them 
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were on the brink of liquidation because of large overdue. By 1956-57 
over 24,000 of these societies were under liquidation (Rutherford 1995). 
As the co-operative movement declined, the government tried to 
revive the co-operative movement from the Union (smallest elected 
administrative unit in the rural area) level in the early 1960s. The Pakistan 
government introduced the "Multipurpose Societies" at the Union level. 
Again, the members of these co-operatives were close to centers of 
influence and they became the influential's source of outside money in 
favorable conditions. The Annual Reports of the Co-operative Directorate 
stated that in the year 1962-63, only one percent of the societies were 
closed or 'thoroughly good' and 86 percent were classified 
'unsatisfactory' (Rutherford 1995). 
The Village Agriculture and Industrial Development (V-AID) 
programme was introduced to facilitate the self-help group in the rural 
areas in the 1960s. It was followed by the "Comilla Model" developed by 
the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARD) in 1960. The 
Comilla Model had four components: the establishment of the Thana (sub-
district) training and development centre; a rural works program for 
construction of road and drainage; a Thana-based irrigation program; and 
a two-tier cooperative system under the Thana Central Co-operative 
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Association. Although these initiatives institutionalized the rural 
cooperative system, they also had a number of problems: 
(a) the cooperatives have been taken over by large farmers; 
(b) discipline of the cooperative never occurred and the recovery rate 
was very low; 
(c) the two-tier co-operatives lacked inner strength and have become 
totally dependent on the government for survival; 
(d) the system ignored the poor and women; 
(e) the co-operatives were not large enough to respond to individual 
needs and aspirations; and 
(f) too-fast expansion of the model made it vulnerable (Rahman 1996). 
The Comilla Model was expanded throughout the country in 1970 
as the Integrated Rural Development Programmes (IRDP). This model 
was based on a group approach and provided credit to the co-operators. 
Under IRDP, farmers were organized into two-tier cooperative groups: 
credit and agricultural output were mobilized through these cooperatives 
(Nath 2004). In 1982, the IRDP was reconstituted as the Bangladesh Rural 
Development Board (BRDB) which is working to strengthen the credit 
programme to the rural poor in Bangladesh. 
3.1.3: The Role of Banks in Rural Credit 
The banking system in the territory of Bangladesh grew slowly 
during the British and Pakistan periods. There were only 25 bank branches 
in 1901, but the number had grown to 668 in 1946. The creation of 
Pakistan was a deterrent in the sector, as was evidenced by the closure of 
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bank branches, which was only 148 in 1950 (Azad 1993). After 
independence from the British, the then-Pakistan government tried a 'new' 
approach to rural credit and established the Agricultural Development 
Finance Corporation in 1952 and the Agricultural Bank of Pakistan in 
1956. These two banks had similar loan conditions, but each had only a 
few branches in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) cities. The loans were 
given to the wealthier farmers and the recovery rates were low. A 
commission in 1959 concluded that the banks had failed to make any 
significant contribution to the rural credit (Rutherford 1995). 
In 1961, the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan was 
established. In addition, the State Bank of Pakistan created a program for 
jute retailers, named, Farias and Beparis, a financing scheme for small 
loans. The loans were collateral free, but trading licenses were deposited 
as collateral (Khaled 2001; Islam 2005). Moreover, as advised by the 
Central Bank, the scheduled banks developed their own small-loan 
schemes for small-scale economic activities: the National Bank of 
Pakistan opened the People's Credit Scheme; Habib Bank Ltd. opened the 
Shop-keepers Loan Scheme; and the United Bank Ltd. opened the Small 
Loan Scheme. These loans were given to the big dealers; banking 
institutions and the legal environment were not suitable for rural credit 
programs. In addition, mass discontent grew up and the political leaders' 
imagination of mass banking made the people confused. As a result, the 
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Faria-Bepari scheme and the small loan schemes imposed by the central 
bank failed to fill the gap in the rural credit system (Khaled 2001). 
After independence in 1971, the new government of Bangladesh 
nationalized all the scheduled banks to fulfill its social commitment to 
introduce people-oriented 'mass banking' to meet people's aspirations. 
Branches were opened in rural areas and started micro-lending to small 
farmers. Rural institutional credit was dispensed mainly through (i) the 
agricultural development bank (Bangladesh Krishi Bank: BKB); (ii) the 
nationalized commercial banks- Sonali, Janata, Agrani, Rupali and all 
private commercial banks; and (iii) the Bangladesh Samabaya Bank Ltd., 
the apex bank for co-operatives. The number of rural branches increased 
rapidly, from 854 in 1975-76 to 3225 in 1983 - 84; and in 1986 there were 
5114 bank branches operating in Bangladesh; of these, 67.4 percent 
branches were serving rural areas (Hossain 1988; Chowdhury and Garcia 
1993). 
Unfortunately, most of the opportunities for the loans were 
received by a few medium and large landowners and influential person. A 
survey conducted by the International Fertilizer Development Centre 
(IFDC) in 1982 showed that in a paddy-growing season only 4.6 percent 
farmers received credit from institutional sources (Hossain 1988). In 
addition, the World Bank calculated that 50 percent of urban and 75 
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percent of rural borrowers did not have access to institutional credit 
(Chowdhury and Garcia 1993). 
The reasons for this lack of adequate institutional credit to the rural 
small borrowers are as follows: complicated and lengthy loan procedures, 
delay and higher transaction cost; restrictive features which also narrowed 
coverage of the traditional credit scope, and the security requirements 
unaffordable to most rural borrowers, who have neither the assets nor 
income to support their loan liability; and the lack of banking and facilities 
in the remote rural areas (Chowdhury and Garcia 1993). Furthermore, the 
credit that is available goes to the rich, who basically do not require it 
(Khandker and Chowdhury 1996). 
In short, it is evident that the formal credit delivery mechanisms 
were not only inadequate in the rural areas but also carried high 
transaction costs, low efficiency, low coverage, and control and 
manipulation by the rich farmers and local influential people (Khandker 
and Chowdhury 1996). 
3.2: Evolution of Microfinance in Bangladesh 
In response to the failure of the formal rural credit delivery system 
to reach the rural poor, alternative credit dealing mechanisms were 
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contemplated in the early 1970s and mid-1980s. The setting up of 
Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), 
Proshika and other government and non-government microfinance 
institution programs were attempts to increase flow of credit/assistance to 
rural areas especially the poor. These targeted credit programs were 
directed towards the rural poor who did not have access to the formal 
credit system and especially to the poor women who were discriminated in 
the labour and credit markets. Moreover, these targeted credit programs 
were group-based (based on joint-liability), peer monitored/mentored in 
contrast to the directed credit delivery system in Bangladesh (Khandker 
and Chowdhury 1996). These non-governmental organization (NGOs) 
credit programs emerged as microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 
Bangladesh. 
3.2:1: The Role of Grameen Bank in the Evolution of Microfinance in 
Bangladesh 
The origin of the microfinance industry can be traced to the 
pioneering effort of Professor Muhammad Yunus's Grameen Bank (GB). 
Microcredit was invented as a strategy for survival of the poor. Professor 
Muhammad Yunus gave collateral-free microcredit to the rural poor 
females of Bangladesh with nearly 100 percent repayment rates. The 
success of Grameen Bank in lending to the poor on a group basis has 
become a livelihood and development strategy not only in Bangladesh but 
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also in other parts of the world. Professor Yunus began his experiment by 
distributing small loans to the poor of the village of Jobra from his own 
pocket and then with the help of Bangladesh Bank, he later expanded the 
project in 1976 as the Grameen Bank Prakalpa (project). Professor 
Yunus's aim was to test the hypothesis that if credit is provided to the poor 
without collateral and at reasonable terms, it could provide self-
employment for them (Wahid 1993). Professor Yunus, with the help of 
Bangladesh Bank (the Central Bank), started to provide small credit to the 
poorest of the poor as a project and later, in 1983, a government ordinance 
transformed the project into Grameen Bank, an independent specialized 
microfinance financial institution for the rural poor. Collateral-free 
financial services were brought to the doorstep of the targeted rural poor 
and exclusively to rural women. From the mid 1980s and the early 1990s, 
there was rapid expansion of Grameen-style microfinance programs all 
over the country and abroad as well. 
The decisive factor in the rapid growth of the sector has 
undoubtedly been the availability of foreign aid. In the beginning, donor 
agencies provided funding on a large scale to organizations such as the 
Grameen Bank. In the 1990s, the Grameen Bank began rapid expansion 
with the help of subsidized donor funds. For example, between 1985 and 
1996 Grameen Bank's membership expanded 12 times and at the same 
time the bank got US$175 million subsidized funds from donors (Morduch 
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1999). In 1992, more than 99 percent funding came from foreign donors, 
although by 1994, the figure had fallen to just 4 percent (Khandker 1998). 
In the mid 1990s, the Grameen Bank received most of its funding from 
Bangladesh Bank. The remaining funds came from the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
and the Ford Foundation (Morduch 1999) 
In the 1990s, the Grameen Bank became able to present itself as a 
second generation microcredit institution and it appeared to be much better 
equipped than it was in its earlier version. This new Grameen Bank II is 
now a real and functioning institution. There was a call for change and it 
got better equipped after the crisis of 1995, namely the withdrawal of 
"Group Fund". In addition, in the flood of 1998, the borrowers lost their 
houses and businesses; they felt the burden of accumulated loans and 
started to stay away from weekly centre meetings. As a result, the 
repayment rate declined. These external factors reinforced the internal 
weaknesses in the system. To overcome this situation, the Grameen Bank 
introduced the new system, "the Grameen Generalized System (GSS)," by 
the beginning of 2001. By April 2002, the Grameen Bank II had emerged. 
In GGS, the "Group Fund" was eliminated and the bank introduced three 
obligatory savings accounts: personal saving account, special saving 
account, and pension deposit account. 
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To make the loan system more flexible, the bank also introduced 
one prime-loan product; called "basic loan." In addition, there are two 
other loan products: housing loans, and higher education loans. In the case 
of failure to pay the basic loan, GGS introduced "Flexible Loan" as an 
alternative way to repay a basic loan. In these ways, the GGS removed the 
tensions from microcredit permanently for both sides, both lenders and 
borrowers. The Grameen II introduced flexible and sustainable 
micro finance institution. 
3.2.2: The Role of BRAC and Other MFIs 
Following independence in 1971, external donor agencies 
supported the government and other private initiatives for 
relief/rehabilitation of displaced population due to war. The NGOs were 
also working for relief and rehabilitation with the support of foreign 
aid/donors support. However, the main focus of the NGOs was basically 
to mobilize masses for empowerment. They believed that without credit or 
access to the credit any development or mobilization of these poor would 
not be effective. For example, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC), started as an NGO in 1972, was in the forefront of 
settlement of displaced families/households due to the liberation war in 
1971. The BRAC believed that the poor need skills development and other 
organizational inputs such as skills promotion and consciousness-raising 
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(Khandker 1998). The NGOs like BRAC identified three problems of 
development: lack of resources including finance; unemployment; and 
lack of social cohesion (Rutherford 1995). The NGOs responded quickly 
to these development failures with credit programs. 
Over time, NGOs like the BRAC and the Grameen Bank have 
learned from each another. The BRAC learned that credit must be 
provided along with skills development training and awareness building. 
The Grameen Bank also realized that credit alone would not be able to 
solve the problems, because their borrowers needed social development 
and organizational inputs for their discipline and poverty reduction 
(Khandker 1998). Moreover, the Grameen Bank model has taken note of 
the major limitations of the Comilla Model of rural development, which 
has been struggling to provide credit to the poor through cooperatives 
(Rahman 1996). 
3.2.3: The Role of Government Credit Program 
Following the examples of BRAC and the Grameen Bank, the 
government of Bangladesh introduced a group-based, targeted-credit 
approach based on the Comilla Model of two-tier cooperatives. Under 
Integrated Rural Development Programs (IRDP), farmers were organized 
into two-tier cooperative groups: credit and agricultural output were 
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mobilized through these cooperatives (Nath 2004). In 1982, the IRDP was 
reconstituted as the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) which 
is working to strengthen the credit programme to the rural poor. In 1988, 
with the funds from the Canadian International Development Agency, the 
progammes of BRDB was strengthened and renamed the Rural 
Development Project-12 (RD-12). It was based on the two-tier cooperative 
structure with the group-lending model of the Grameen-style delivery 
model (Khandker 1998). In addition to these, the government's various 
ministries and divisions are also providing credit to the poor. 
3.2.4: Current Position of MFIs 
The history of microfinance in Bangladesh spans more than 35 
years. Among the pioneers, the BRAC and the Grameen Bank launched 
their operations inl974 and 1976 respectively. One third of the MFIs were 
established between 1995 and 2000 (Credit and Development Forum 
2006). About 47 percent of the MFIs are relatively late entrants (Graph 
3.1). They joined the industry from 2001 onwards. As of February 2007, 
4236 MFIs have applied to Microfinance Regulatory Authority (MRA) for 
license (MRA Report 2006). Although the number is very big, the industry 
is dominated by Grameen Bank and three other MFIs (BRAC, ASA, and 
Proshika). Table 3.3 illustrates the scale of these institutions. These four 
institutions combined have over $1189 million in outstanding loans and 
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around US$594 million in savings. The differences between the borrowers 
and members reflect a variety of services provided by these MFIs. 
Table 3.3: Microcredit Portfolios of the Big three MFIs and the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (As of end- December 2006) 
Organization Active Outstanding Savings Cumulative Outstanding 
Members Borrowers Million Disbursement Loan 
Million Million US$ Million US$ Million US$ 
Grameen 
Bank 
BRAC 
ASA 
Proshika 
Total 
6.9 
5.3 
6.5 
2.8 
21.5 
6.9 
4.6 
5.2 
1.7 
18.4 
390.48 
151.55 
48.75 
2.64 
593.42 
5750.57 
2981.10 
2521.44 
501.13 
11754.24 
471.19 
345.53 
300.42 
71.50 
1188.64 
Source: Credit and Development Forum 2006. 
After the big four, there are only twelve MFIs who have more than 
100,000 borrowers. Around 30 MFIs are categorized as medium, large and 
very large and can be considered as the major players of the sector (Credit 
and Development Forum 2006; Microcredit Regulatory Authority 2006). 
3.2.5: Why in Bangladesh 
After the fierce liberation struggle of 1971, Bangladesh was facing 
multiple challenges to rebuild the nation, with the challenges of the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of the displaced. In addition, the nation 
frequently faced natural disasters. A survey found that over 80 percent of 
the population was living in poverty in 1973-1974 (cited in Aghion and 
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Morduch 2005). After independence in 1971, the donors supported the 
government and private initiatives for relief and rehabilitation of the 
displaced during the war. The NGOs were also working for relief and 
rehabilitation with the support of foreign aid/donors. However, the main 
focuses of the NGOs were mobilizing mass people and building 
awareness, neither of which worked well (Rutherford 1995). 
The new government tried to develop programs for the rural poor; 
one program was a credit program for the rural poor through mass 
banking. This had a limited impact on the livelihood of the rural poor. As 
a result of the grave situation in the rural area, some visionary leaders 
came forward with their long-term vision to rebuild the country. During 
the liberation war volunteer groups were helping freedom fighters and 
refugees. The driving forces behind these self-motivated volunteer groups 
were moral, ethical, humanitarian and patriotic. Some of them were also 
ideologically motivated. 
After independence, these volunteer groups continued to work with 
the people to rehabilitate them in a new country. In a short time, they 
founded organizations for social welfare and development and NGOs for 
development. Some of these organizations became today's BRAC, Gono 
Sasthya and Rangpur Dinajpur Rural Service (RDRS) (Khaled 2001). 
Moreover, some of them were revolutionary such as the ASA's founder 
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who wanted to set off a process of rural change which would eventually 
become a big driving force of the nation and come into state power within 
a decade (Rutherford 1995). The visionary leaders were born out of 
necessity and gradually expanded their activities from community 
development to income generation activities for the rural poor. These non-
governmental organizations started to provide credit to the rural poor 
gradually and established themselves as microfinance institutions. A 
number of NGOs also replicated their credit program and transformed 
themselves as microfinance institutions (MFIs). These MFIs in 2004 
accounted for 5.3 percent of the total private sector credit in Bangladesh 
(Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4: Share of Microfinance Credit as a Proportion of Total 
Private Sector Credit (in million- US$) 
Banks 
Non-banks 
Microfinance institutions 
Total 
Microfinance as % of private sector credit 
2002 
1167.0 
42.5 
62.7 
1272.2 
4.9% 
2003 
1328.7 
54.1 
73.7 
1456.5 
5.1% 
2004 
1495.9 
66.6 
87.9 
1650.4 
5.3% 
Source: Zaman et al. 2007. 
Note:a Includes PKSF, Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA, and Proshika 
The main source of funding of MFIs came from donors and 
government which were instrumental in the homogeneity of the growth 
and development of the MFI sector (Table 3.5). One decisive factor in the 
rapid growth of the sector has undoubtedly been the availability of foreign 
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aid. During the 1980s, the donors began funding on a large scale to 
organization such as BRAC, the Grameen Bank, RDRS, ASA, and 
Proshika, now the largest MFIs in Bangladesh. Foreign grants to the MFIs 
averaged US$160 million annually in first half of the 1990s and have 
grown US$255 million annually since then (Zaman et. al. 2007). For 
example, from the beginning BRAC was 100 percent subsidized and its 
expenditure from the beginning to 1985 was 100 percent covered by the 
donors; even in 2006 it was almost 30 percent (BRAC Annual Report 
2006). In the case of Grameen Bank, in 1992 more than 99 percent of its 
funding came from foreign donors, although by 1994 the figure had fallen 
to just 4 percent (Khandker 1998). 
Table 3.5: Sources of Funds for Microfinance Lending (%) 
Sources 
A. External Sources: Donors 
B. Internal Sources 
Bl. MFIs own sources 
i) Members savings 
ii) Service charge 
iii) Own fund 
B2: Other sources 
i) PKSF 
ii) Local Banks 
iii) Others 
Total (A + B) 
Source: Credit and Development 
1996 
48.5 
39.6 
20.4 
19.2 
11.8 
2.4 
9.5 
100 
Forum 1996, 
1998 
28.0 
36.0 
22.6 
13.4 
36.0 
23.2 
12.8 
100 
2003,: 
2000 
18.6 
81.4 
45 
25.5 
16 
3.6 
36.4 
23.0 
9.8 
3.7 
100 
2006. 
2002 
15.3 
84.7 
50.6 
26.9 
17.8 
5.9 
34.1 
21.9 
9.1 
3.1 
100 
2004 
10.6 
89.3 
56.6 
28.5 
23.7 
4.4 
32.7 
17.0 
12.7 
3.0 
100 
2006 
6.0 
94.0 
59.8 
28.8 
26.5 
4.5 
34.2 
13.9 
17.6 
2.7 
100 
At the same time, public policy directed at the MFIs played an 
important role in the growth of the sector, giving the MFIs the necessary 
functional autonomy to operate and innovate. In addition, the successive 
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government's favorable policies to the MFIs were instrumental to the 
sector's growth (Zaman et al. 2007). 
3.3: Analysis of the Microfinance Programs in Bangladesh 
Both BRAC and the Grameen Bank started microcredit programs 
in the mid 1970s. However, until thel990s, only a few organizations were 
delivering credit to the poor. The early 1990s was a period of rapid 
expansion of the Grameen-style microcredit program (Zaman 2004). 
Graph 3.1: Rate of Growth of MFIs in Bangladesh- 1971-2006 
Source: Credit and Development Forum 2006. 
A shift from group lending to individual lending also occurred and 
more professionalism came to the sector. At this time, the Palli Karma -
Sahayak Foundation (PKSF—the rural employment generating 
foundation) emerged as the wholesale financing institution to the MFIs. 
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By the 1990s, trial-and-error experimentation in the fields led to a big 
push that spearheaded a massive expansion of microfinance activities 
during the 1990s. The PKSF contributed significantly to the expansion of 
microcredit programs in Bangladesh as an apex body of financing and 
helped to organize them with proper procedures and regulations. 
Furthermore, microfinance service was now covering almost the entire 
country. Graph 3.1 shows that one third of the MFIs were established 
between 1995 and 2000. About 47 percent of the MFIs are relatively late 
entrants, joining the industry only from 2001 onwards. 
Graph 3.2: Growth of Borrowers of MFIs— 1996 - 2006 (in millions) 
Source: Credit and Development Forum 1996, 2006. 
The principal microfinance service providers in Bangladesh are 
usually divided into four major categories: microfinance institutions 
(MFIs); specialized institutions (Grameen Bank and PKSF); banks 
(nationalized and private commercial bank); and government ministries 
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/divisions. However, three MFIs (BRAC, ASA and Proshika) and the 
Grameen Bank share almost eighty percent of the microfinance sector. 
After the big four, there are only twelve MFIs who have more than 
100,000 borrowers. Around 30 MFIs, categorized as medium, large and 
very large, can be considered as the major players of the sector. 
Table 3.6 shows the major indicators of MFIs outreach in 
Bangladesh. In 1997, although total outstanding borrowers were only 4.26 
million, this increased rapidly in 2006 to 16 million; and cumulative 
disbursement of the MFIs in 1997 was US$968 million, increasing to 
US$7948 million in 2006. These figures indicate the tremendous growth 
of the sector in Bangladesh (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6: MFIs in Bangladesh— Key Indicators 
Indicators 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
(N=380) (N= (N=656) (N=721) (N=6U) 
533) 
6.74 7.99 12.86 16.62 20.51 
15.84 16.24 30.76 
553 883 1,165 
74 136 224 295 352 
968 1,812 3,603 5,615 7,948 
25,060 32,233 42,918 59,215 79,464 
Active Members (million) 
Cumulative Borrowers (million) 
Cumulative Savings deposit (in 
US$ million) 
Net Savings (in US$ million) 
Cumulative Loan Disbursement 
(in US$ million) 
Total credit staff 
Source: Credit and Development Forum 1998, 1999, 2006. 
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3.3.1: Scaling-up of MFIs in Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, the outreach of MFIs has increased substantially; 
the number of active members increased three fold during 1997-2006 
(from 6.7 million in 1996 to 20.5 million in 2006) (Table 3.6). The 
cumulative loan disbursement increased nearly nine-fold— from US$ 968 
million in 1997 to US$ 7,948 million in 2006 (Table 3.6). 
Table 3.7: Indicators of Financial Self-Sufficiency and Profitability of 
MFIs in Bangladesh— 2001- 2004 
Category Indicators 2001 2002 2003 2004 
(%) (%) (%) ™ 
Very Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS) 
Small Return on Equity (ROE) 
Small Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Medium Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
ASA Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
BRAC Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
168 
n.a 
128 
n.a 
144 
n.a 
113 
10.9 
107 
n.a 
122 
3.8 
113 
1.7 
122 
3.5 
169 
10 
111 
2.3 
119 
3.4 
122 
3.4 
122 
3.6 
173 
10.5 
118 
3.4 
121 
4.0 
127 
4.8 
119 
3.2 
269 
15.0 
117 
3.3 
Source: Zaman 2004; Mix Market (web http://www.mixmarket.org). 
Notes: n.a—not available 
The increasing outreach of MFIs in Bangladesh has enabled them to 
enhanced profitability. The return on equity (ROE) of all categories of MFIs 
(Very small, small, medium, large and very large MFIs like BRAC and 
ASA)5 has recorded rapid growths during 2001- 2004 (Table 3.7). 
MFI's borrowers less than 10,000 is classified as very small, borrowers from 10,000 to less than 
50,000 is classified as small, borrowers from 50,000 to less than 100,000 is medium, borrowers 
from 100,000 to less than 1,000,000 is large and borrowers 1,000,000 to above is called the very 
large MFIs, such as BRAC, ASA, GB, etc. 
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Table 3.8: Microfinance Outreach Indicators of MFIs in Bangladesh— 
2001-2004 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
Very Small MFIs 
Borrowers per credit officer 
Portfolio per credit office 
Cost ratio 
Small MFIs 
Borrowers per credit officer 
Portfolio per credit office 
Cost ratio 
Medium MFIs 
Borrowers per credit officer 
Portfolio per credit office 
Cost ratio 
ASA 
Borrowers per credit officer 
Portfolio per credit office 
Cost ratio 
BRAC 
Borrowers per credit officer 
Portfolio per credit office 
Cost ratio 
148 161 167 207 
570,000 573,000 630,000 811,000 
7.6% 9.9% 9.9% 9.2% 
190 200 209 207 
506,000 576,000 622,000 677,000 
10.5% 10.3% 9.9% 9.1% 
345 448 461 461 
686,000 733,000 740,000 898,000 
8.8% 11.4% 10.1% 9.6% 
345 4408 461 461 
1,310,00 1,700,00 1,970,00 2,110,00 
0 0 0 0 
4.1% 3.4% 3.3% 3.1% 
298 364 
n.a 881,000 1,160,00 
0 
n.a 12.6% 11.5% 
n.a 
n.a 
Source: Zaman et al. 2007. 
Notes: n.a—not available 
The ROE of very small MFIs in Bangladesh were relatively high 
(amount 3.8 to 4.0%) as compared with small and medium MFIs in 
Bangladesh. The financial sustainability indicator reflecting the ratio of 
financial revenue to financial expenses was relatively high (larger than 
100) for all categories of MFI's in Bangladesh (Table 3.7) 
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3.4: The Current Legal and Regulatory Framework of MFIs in 
Bangladesh 
The legal framework for MFIs has not undergone any substantial 
change in recent times. The NGOs in general derive their legal rights from 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association with the country. 
Although most of the NGO-MFIs are registered with one agency or the 
other, there are some NGO-MFIs which are not registered with any agency 
in Bangladesh. One of the most important laws for the registration of 
MFIs dates back to 1860 and the newest one is in 1982. There are 12 
different statutes for MFIs registration in Bangladesh. The most important 
laws and regulations for the registration and operation of the development 
NGOs-MFIs the Societies Registration Act of 1860; Trust Act of 1882; 
Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Regulation & Control) Ordinance of 
1961; Charitable & Religious Trust Act of 1920; Company Act of 1913; 
and Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Ordinance of 
1978 (Zaman et al. 2007; Khaled 2001). These laws and regulations are 
implemented by four government agencies: the Social Welfare Ministry, 
the NGO Affairs Bureau, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of 
Women and Children Affairs (Zaman et al. 2007). 
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Table 3.9: Present Reporting System of MFIs 
Law Regulatory Authority 
Societies Registration Act of 1860, Joint Stock Companies (Commerce 
Companies Act 1913/1994 as a non-profit Ministry) 
Companies 
Voluntary Social Welfare Ordinance of 1961 Social Welfare Ministry 
Foreign Contribution Ordinance of 1962, NGO Affairs Bureau (Under this 
Foreign Donations Regulation Ordinance of law no organization can be formed, 
1978 it gives the permission for foreign 
fund) 
Trust Act of 1882 Ministry of Law 
Other relevant laws Some are enlisted under Dept. of 
Family Planning, Youth 
Development and others 
Source: Rashid 2005:11. 
Most of the NGO-MFIs in Bangladesh are registered with the 
Societies Registration Act of 1860. Over 16,000 NGOs/MFIs are 
registered under this act (Khaled 2001). Registering with this law is very 
simple and no provision is made for whether or not the society is 
maintaining any audit or accounts. The Trust Act of 1882 is another law 
providing the legal basis for MFIs. The Companies Act of 1913, which 
was amended in 1994, provides a legal basis for not-for-profit companies 
(Zaman et al. 2007). In addition, a large number of MFIs are registered 
under the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Regulation and Control) 
Ordinance of 1961. Other than these, NGOs whose are receiving foreign 
donations must be registered under the Foreign Donations (Voluntary 
Activities) Ordinance of 1978 with the NGO Affairs Bureau. About 1200 
MFIs are currently receiving foreign funds and almost 1900 MFIs are 
registered with the NGO Affairs Bureau (Zaman et al. 2007). 
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Table 3.10: Regulatory Environment of Microfinance Operation in 
Bangladesh 
Legal statute 
Banks- Bank- Companies Act of 1991 
Grameen Bank- Grameen Bank 
Ordinance of 1983 
NGOs— Under different Laws /Acts 
Government Programs 
Co-operatives—Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance of 1984 
Regulatory Authority 
Bangladesh Bank 
Government 
Different Ministries/Division of 
Government of GOB 
Different Ministries 
LGRD and Cooperatives Ministry 
Source: Rashid 2005:10. 
The NGOs operating in microfinance do not have to fulfill any 
extra terms and conditions or regulations for operating credit programs for 
the poor in Bangladesh (Khaled 2001). They carry out financial 
intermediation by mobilizing savings and extending microfinance to their 
members. They are like quasi-banks, but not governed by the banking 
laws and regulations of the country. In recent years, the government's 
concerns (from the financial stability point of view) have grown 
significantly with the increase in size, outreach and savings deposit of MFI 
operations. Considering the need for a regulatory system, the Government 
of Bangladesh passed a law in 2006, which led to the creation of the 
Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), which is endowed with the 
powers to license, monitor and regulate MFI's in Bangladesh. 
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3.4.1: The Role of the Microfinance Regulatory Authority (MRA) 
The main objectives of the MRA are the efficient regulation of 
microcredit programs and institutions and the ensuring of transparency 
and accountability in the activities of microcredit organizations operating 
in Bangladesh. By February 2007, 4,236 MFIs had applied to MRA for 
license. The MRA has specified that license will issued only to the MIFs 
with a minimum of 1000 or more borrowers or equal to or more than 
$58,000 loans outstanding. Accordingly, only applications from 705 
MFI's were approved. Up to May 20, 2008, the MRA has issued 250 
licenses to different MFIs and the licensing procedure for other selected 
MFIs is under process (Microcredit Regulatory Authority 2008). The 
MRA is also working to prepare detailed rules and policies to monitor and 
supervise licensed MFIs that will cover governance issues, financial 
transparency, mode of operations and other related issues to ensure 
transparency and accountability in operation. 
3.4.2: The Role of the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) 
The Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) was established in 
1990 by the Government of Bangldesh as an apex body of MFIs, the only 
apex wholesale financing body in Bangladesh. Its main objective is to 
build organizations like MFIs for eradicating poverty in the rural areas and 
subsequently in urban areas as well. The basic operational strategies of 
PKSF (Rural Employment Support Foundation) are the following: lend 
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money through its Partner Organizations (POs) especially to the NGO-
MFIs; provide greater thrust to institutional development, both in its own 
capacity as an apex organization as well as the capacities of partner 
organizations (MFIs). The PKSF does not support any particular model or 
approach of microfinance; it advocates for appropriate policies and 
regulations useful for the microcredit sector in Bangladesh. Therefore, 
PKSF, as an apex body of microfinance program is helping to develop an 
appropriate regulatory framework, as well as helping the MFIs in funding 
their microfinance program for the poor. 
3.5: Conclusion 
In Bangladesh, microfinance developed out of necessity and the 
environment helped its tremendous growth. In this development, Professor 
Dr. Yunus' Grameen Bank stands out as a model for all over the world for 
lending to the poor without collateral. Apart from the Grameen Bank a 
number of MFIs under various legal statuses exist in Bangladesh and their 
outreach has grown over the years. The growth of Grameen Bank and 
MFIs in the earlier years has been facilitated by cheap donor funds. This 
was supplemented by funds and support from central bank (Bangladesh 
Bank) and rural development regulator (PKSF). Lately attempt is made 
under the umbrella of Microfinance Regulatory Authority (MRA) an arm 
of the Bangladesh Bank to license, monitor and regulate MFIs in 
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Bangladesh. Overall, the most of the MFIs has attained financial self-
sufficiency and has recorded good returns on their equity. 
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Chapter IV: 
Database and Research Methodology 
This chapter provides a brief description of the database and 
research methodology used in this study. The chapter is divided into three 
sections: section 4.1 provides an overview of the secondary data used in 
the study; section 4.2 explains the sampling methodology and the 
description of primary data; and section 4.3 provides a brief overview of 
the analytical framework used in empirical investigation. 
4.1: Data 
In Bangladesh, there are two primary sources of data on MFIs; one 
is provided by a self-regulatory body called Credit and Development 
Forum (CDF), which provides statistics on microfinance industry in 
Bangladesh on a regular basis from 1995. The other source is the official 
statistics provided by the report of the newly established Microfinance 
Regulatory Authority of Bangladesh Bank (the central bank of the 
country). The CDF is a microfinance apex organization that compiles data 
from its members only. The CDF has been publishing microfinance data 
from 1995 and its latest issue 2006 (published only in 2008) contains self-
reported information of 611 MFIs in Bangladesh. To understand the long-
term trend and dynamics of MFI, the CDF data is most appropriate and 
valuable, although it has coverage limitations. 
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The Microfinance Regulatory Authority was established recently 
(in 2006) to replace the Microfinance Research and Reference Unit 
(MRRU) which existed under the Bangladesh Bank- the central bank of 
the country. The MRRU was in existence from 2000 to bring microfinance 
industry under a single regulatory framework and started publishing data 
from 2004. The MRA report summarizes the information provided by the 
MFIs in their application form for a license. The latest data compiled by 
MRA, relating to 641 MFIs, are more comprehensive than that of Credit 
and Development Forum (CDF) database. 
The data from the CDF and MRA provide information about the 
MFIs basic characteristics of MFIs in Bangladesh: inception date, 
branches, number of groups, numbers of members, numbers of borrowers, 
total savings, total debt, recovery rate, and so on. These data formed the 
initial database for our primary survey. 
4.2: Methodology and Description of Primary Data 
The primary data of corporate governance indicators of MFIs in 
Bangladesh are collected through a primary survey (a structured 
questionnaire). The variables included in the survey relate to board size, 
board independence, board composition, tenure, gender composition, and 
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other areas and have been selected by scanning the existing literature on 
corporate governance, in particular literature that relates to MFIs. 
Sample Size 
In the selection of the sample, we stratified the population of MFIs 
according to size and used the random sampling method within the 
stratified population to generate a sample cohort. The purpose of the 
sampling method was to attain a high usage (in terms of borrowers). 
As of June 2006, these 36 MFIs in our sample cover 34 percent of 
total members (all members are not borrowers), 40 percent of the total 
borrowers, 46 percent of outstanding loan, and 54 percent of the total 
saving of MFIs services sector in the country. This study also includes the 
Grameen Bank, which covers almost 27 percent of the borrowers of 
microfinance sector in Bangladesh (Credit and Development Forum 2006: 
2). Thus, our study covers nearly 67 per cent of the total borrowers in 
Bangladesh based on information for the year 2008. Table 4.2 reports the 
basic characteristics of the sample. Since the focus of the study was on 
corporate governance aspects (especially relating to board characteristics, 
composition, size and auditor independence), this additional information 
was collected through a structured questionnaire based on visits to their 
head office. 
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Table: 4.1: Organizational Profiles: Basic Information of Studied MFIs 
Name of MFIs 
Alliance for Cooperation and 
Legal Aid Bangladesh 
(ACLAB) 
Antar Society for Development 
Annesha Foundation 
Assistance For Social 
Organization & Development 
(ASOD) 
Association of Development 
for Economic & Social Help 
(ADESH) 
Association for Social 
Advancement & Rural 
Rehabilitation 
Bangladesh Extension 
Education Services (BEES) 
BRAC 
Buro Bangladesh 
Centre for Development 
Services (CDS) 
Chirontoni 
Christian Service Society 
(CSS) 
Development Initiative for 
Social Advancement (DISA) 
Duhshtha Shasthya Kendra 
(DSK) 
Generation Development 
Society (GDS) 
Gharoni 
Grameen Bank 
HEED Bangladesh 
Muslim Aid-UK 
Padakhep Manabik Unnayan 
Kendra (PMUK) 
Palli Bikash Kendra (PBK) 
Peoples Oriented Program 
Implementation (POPI) 
RDRS 
Resource Integration Centre 
(RIC) 
Date of 
Inception 
1994 
2004 
1991 
1986 
1995 
2001 
1988 
1974 
1990 
1989 
2002 
1972 
1994 
1985 
1998 
2002 
1976 
1990 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1986 
1991 
1989 
Total 
Members 
570 
1516 
32648 
77006 
5168 
2700 
96328 
5310317 
313350 
4340 
1525 
33046 
6316 
94310 
9042 
6604 
6908704 
89593 
24203 
116708 
34938 
126610 
348536 
48116 
Total 
Borrowers 
493 
1479 
25839 
66962 
3368 
2158 
79551 
4550855 
243948 
3465 
458 
29488 
4844 
68736 
4620 
5803 
6908704 
60884 
20575 
103087 
30090 
105689 
338079 
34992 
Total Savings 
658838 
1957783 
49768695 
70995827 
8535901 
1530700 
107687974 
10595070000 
550560564 
5432484 
4935923 
36560460 
9786120 
165517601 
2624294 
3396041 
43274470000 
167530956 
27317566 
190727703 
46908391 
128212402 
255425407 
81033109 
Outstanding 
Loan 
1843852 
6595037 
119741173 
230885712 
18107933 
9423850 
341095953 
24156690000 
1359068888 
151571515 
6845170 
134014808 
22580209 
315717366 
6525072 
10075144 
33235460000 
277855491 
69624146 
679102668 
122008893 
374208314 
705835167 
230020666 
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Rural Agricultural Social 
Development Organization 
(RASDO) 
Rural Health & Development 
Society (RHDS) 
Sajida Foundation 
SATU 
Shakti Foundation For 
Disadvantaged Women 
Society for Social Service 
(SSS) 
Swanirvar Bangladesh 
Sylhet Jubo Academy (SJA) 
Tangail Samaj Unnayan 
Sangstha (TSUS) 
Thengamara Mohila Sabuj 
Sangha (TMSS) 
UDDIPAN 
Uttara Development Program 
Society (UDPS) 
Village Education Resource 
Centre (VERC) 
Total borrowers 
2000 696 628 1062767 3419755 
1997 
1993 
1994 
1992 
1990 
1978 
1991 
1994 
1987 
1991 
1988 
1982 
3214 
42163 
26317 
172741 
232218 
19657 
1456 
2350 
499035 
96249 
47658 
27110 
14863058 
2829 
40374 
20502 
119139 
184902 
17835 
1018 
1846 
437715 
74274 
38181 
20899 
13654309 
6903526 
91369727 
31408020 
638425800 
371517009 
16071490 
737765 
4020932 
962545383 
195466324 
68071283 
60777735 
58235022500 
10486235 
261773491 
79431454 
971540004 
1045118573 
65179646 
2048360 
9585930 
2148307115 
412665949 
187630643 
144164534 
67926248716 
Source: Microfinance Regulatory Authority 2006; Credit and Development Forum 
2006. 
4.3: Analytical Framework 
For this study, primary data collected from the MFIs in Bangladesh 
were analyzed using descriptive statistics. We also employed cross-
section regression (based on ordinary least squares) to analyze the impact 
of corporate governance variables on the financial performance of MFIs as 
given below: 
ROA = ao + oti log (TA) ,t + a,2 (Auditor Independence Dummy) lt + 013 
Board Composition Dummy,, + Board Size Dummy
 lt+ £,t 
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Chapter V: 
Governance of Grameen Bank of Bangladesh: 
A Brief Analysis 
The concept of micro finance owes its origin to the Grameen Bank 
in Bangladesh, which was established as a specialized bank for 
micro finance (similar to an industrial or agricultural bank) in 1983 under a 
separate charter. Its successful lending model to the poor, based on group 
joint-liability (association of poor borrowers), is widely emulated 
worldwide as a model of providing credit to the poor and as an anti-
poverty strategy. Of its 7 million active borrowers, nearly 97 per cent of 
them are women. The average loan size is around US$100 and the bank 
boasts of a repayment record of about 98 per cent which far exceeds the 
record of other formal financial intermediaries like banks throughout the 
world. 
In 2006, the Grameen Bank, along with its founder Dr. 
Mohammed Yunus, won the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts "...to 
create economic and social development from below". The Nobel 
selection committee said that the peace prize was for developing what 
"...had appeared to be an impossible idea", namely loans to people who 
lack collateral. In the initial phases of its development, Grameen bank had 
6littp://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html. Accessed on 
November 29, 2009. 
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to depend on the savings of its members and funds from philanthropic 
funds. Lately, however, it has become self-sufficient and has expanded 
beyond its borders. This chapter is devoted to an analysis of corporate 
governance of Grameen Bank. The chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 5.1 provides a brief history of Grameen Bank and its roles in rural 
credit infrastructure in Bangladesh. Section 5.2 the credit delivery model 
of Grameen Bank is discussed and section 5.3 discusses the growth and 
economic performance of the bank. Section 5.4 discusses the bank's 
governance; and section 5.5 provides the conclusion of the chapter. 
5.1: A Brief History of Grameen Bank 
After gaining independence in 1971 from Pakistan, Bangladesh 
inherited a very weak and fragile economic (including credit and banking) 
system. The loan or credit market, especially in rural areas, was still 
dominated by informal lenders - moneylenders who performed these tasks 
independently or in conjunction with other tasks like petty trading, 
commission agents, share-cropping, etc. The formal financial institutions 
like banks had an urban bias and were almost nonexistent in rural areas. 
The non-institutional sources dominated the rural loan market: in 1992, 62 
percent of the rural households obtained loans from the moneylenders or 
the informal credit market (Hossain 1988). Nearly 92 percent of the 
functionally landless households were dependent on the informal market/ 
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moneylenders. Moreover, in many cases the average rate of interest 
charged was estimated at 125 percent a year (Hossain 1988). 
The new government of Bangladesh sought a solution to the elitist 
behavior of the formal banking system and came up with a solution of 
social control of financial intermediaries; in 1972 all scheduled banks in 
Bangladesh were nationalized and an era of social banking or mass 
banking was initiated. Through government control, bank branches were 
opened in the rural areas and started lending to small farmers. Rural 
institutional credit was dispensed mainly through the nationalized banking 
system. Consequently, the number of rural branches increased rapidly, 
from 854 in 1975-76 to 3,225 in 1983- 84. In 1986 there were 5,114 bank 
branches operating in Bangladesh; of these, 67.4 percent branches were 
serving the rural areas (Hossain 1988; Chowdhury and Garcia 1993). 
However, most of the loans were given to medium and large 
landowners and to people with good social and political connections. A 
survey conducted by the International Fertilizer Development Centre 
(IFDC) in 1982 showed that in a paddy growing season only 4.6 percent 
farmers received credit from institutional sources (Hossain 1988). The 
World Bank estimated that 50 percent of urban and 75 percent of rural 
borrowers did not have access to institutional credit (Chowdhury and 
Garcia 1993). 
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The cooperative system based on the Comilla Model (discussed in 
chapter III) was expanded throughout the country in 1970 as part of the 
Integrated Rural Development Programmes (IRDP). This model was 
based on group an approach and provided credit to the membership of co-
operatives. Under IRDP, farmers were organized into two-tier cooperative 
groups. The two-tier cooperative is a co-operative system comprising 
village-based primary cooperative societies called Krishak Samabaya 
Samity (KSS) (Farmers cooperative association) at the local level. 
Members of KSS accumulate capital through weekly savings. Every KSS 
formulates joint production of plans, and creates a block of 50 to 100 acres 
of land in the village in order to facilitate the economic adoption of 
irrigation, institutional credit and improved farming. The KSS receives 
credit from the Thana Central Cooperative Association (TCCA), which is 
a larger administrative unit (Momin 1987). The credit and agricultural 
outputs are mobilized through these cooperatives. The co-operative 
movement was controlled by large farmers and the system ignored the 
poor and women (Rahman 1996). 
In response to the failure of the formal rural credit delivery 
system, the informal moneylenders patron-client relations, and their high 
interest rate (sometimes more than 125 percent), targeted credit programs 
were developed in the late 1970s into the mid-1980s. The Grameen Bank 
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is one of the pioneer microfinance banks that was created to make credit 
directly available to the rural poor who do not have access to a formal 
credit system and to focus exclusively on women. Moreover, this targeted 
credit program used group-based peer monitoring, a closely supervised 
credit approach which is different from the formal credit institutions; this 
makes a significant difference in the rural credit market in Bangladesh 
(Khandker and Chowdhury 1996). 
The origin of the microfinance industry can be traced to the 
pioneering efforts of Professor Muhammad Yunus' Grameen Bank. The 
bank's origin goes back to a chance meeting of the founder, Mohammad 
Yunus, with a bamboo stool maker, Sufia Khatoon, in the village of Jobra 
in the southern part of rural Bangladesh. Sufia was making bamboo stools 
with raw materials supplied on credit by a moneylender, who then bought 
the finished product. The money lender set both the price of raw materials 
and the price of the finished product. After paying for the raw materials, 
Sufia had hardly enough left to feed her family of five. Sufia made two 
cents from each stool which meant that she had to return to the money 
lender for credit. 
Seeing this exploitative situation, Professor Yunus tried to find out 
how many other people were in the same situation as Sufia in the village. 
With the help of his students and through a survey, he found that there 
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were 42 such people. Professor Yunus gave collateral-free microcredit 
(US$27) to these exploited people out of his own pocket. The initial loan 
that Professor Yunus made was repaid in full. This strengthened his belief 
in the poor's ability and willingness to repay and provided the foundation 
for the creation of Grameen Bank, which was turned into a development 
philosophy. 
Subsequently, with the help of the Bangladesh Bank (the central 
bank in Bangladesh); he later expanded the project in 1976 as Grameen 
Bank Prakalpa. Later, in 1983, a government ordinance transformed the 
project into the Grameen Bank—a village bank, an independent 
specialized microfinance financial institution for the rural poor. The 
announcement of the Norwegian Nobel Committee to award the Nobel 
Peace Prize to Professor Yunus and Grameen Bank points out that the 
Grameen Bank has been a source of ideas and a model for the many 
institutions in the field of micro-credit that have sprung up around the 
world (The Nobel Peace Committee 2006). 
The Grameen Bank was established as a challenge to the existing 
collateral-based banking system and the exploitative moneylenders 
(Khandker et al. 1995). Professor Yunus argues, "....the money-lending 
business has served as an expensive alternative to official institutions, but 
it often undermines individual efforts to alleviate situations of poverty. 
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Money lenders can charge exorbitant interest rates that initiate an endless 
cycle of poverty and debt..." (Yunus 2007b: 21). Collateral-free financial 
services were brought to the doorstep of the rural poor, especially to the 
rural women. Professor Yunus also notes that "...the new system should 
target the detrimental effects of money lending by freeing borrowers from 
high interest rates and any pressures or legal requirements to repay 
loans " (Yunus 2007b: 21). Therefore, Grameen Bank wants to save 
the poor from the clutches of the exploitative moneylender whose role 
impoverishes the poor. The moneylenders charge exorbitant interest rates 
(in the range of 60 to 300 per cent) an action that creates indebtedness and 
perpetuates the vicious circle of poverty. 
On the other hand, the traditional banking system neglected the 
poor because of the lack of collateral and high transaction costs. The 
Grameen Bank differs from traditional banks in the "....value of the 
principal amounts and types of the loans it offers, the terms of its loans, 
the repayment conditions of its loans, its lending procedures and in the 
overall social consciousness and guidance that it incorporates in its loan 
policies.." (Hassan 2002: 240). The Grameen Bank focuses not on profit 
but on the needs of its borrowers. Professor Yunus notes, "...the objective 
is to bring financial services to the impoverished, particularly women and 
the poorest of the poor, to aid them in their fight against poverty and 
ensure that their business endeavors remain financially sound. It is a 
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composite objective with both social and economic visions...." (Yunus 
2007b:21). For this, it provides organizational support to the poor to make 
effective use of their credit and income. In Yunus words, "...micro-credit 
is a well trained and well funded method that can bring financial services 
to the poor. Micro-credit promotes entrepreneurship, and put each 
individual poor person, especially women in the driving seat, in their own 
lives..." (cited in Mjos 2006). 
Lamia Karim (2008) summarizes the declared objectives from 
Grameen Bank's document as follows: according to Professor Yunus, the 
GB model of micro credit (MC) is not solely a matter of the extension of 
credit; it has a unique set of social objectives that it aims to implement 
through MC policies. These are: 
• It promotes credit as human right. 
• It is aimed towards the poor, particularly poor women. 
• It is based on "trust", not on legal procedures and system. 
• It is offered to create self-employment, income-generating 
activities and housing for the poor, as opposed to consumption. 
• It was initiated as a challenge to conventional banking which 
rejected the poor by classifying them as "not creditworthy." 
• It provides service on the doorstep of the poor based on the 
principle that the people should not go to the bank, the bank should 
go to the people. 
• It gives high priority to building social capital (cited in Muhammad 
2009: 38-39). 
Now Grameen Bank is the world's largest bank for the poorest of 
the poor, and is based on a different philosophy from traditional banking. 
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It is more about people than about money. Professor Yunus says, "...lend 
the poor money in amounts which suit them, teach them a few sound 
financial principles, they manage on their own..." (cited by the Chairman 
of Nobel Peace Prize Committee). Since its formal opening in 1983 it has 
lent almost eight billion US dollar. Today the bank has almost eight 
million borrowers; Grameen Bank lends US$800 million dollars per year. 
The bank is presently self-sufficient and has also generated a return on 
assets in the range of 0.11 to 2.5 per cent per annum in recent years (2001-
2007) (www.grameen.com). 
5.2: The Credit Delivery Model of the Grameen Bank 
The Grameen Bank has integrated group activity with credit 
delivery to assist the rural poor in income-generating activities. In the 
process of the Grameen Bank credit program, households first take the 
initiative to organizing themselves into a group of five. The Grameen bank 
officials most often help the households in the formation of the group. 
Men and women form separate groups, considering the religious and 
societal values of Bangladesh society. Membership in a group is strictly 
limited to people who own less than half an acre of land or whose assets 
do not exceed the value of one acre of land, live in a village and are not 
members of the same households. Therefore, the members of the group 
belong to the same socio-economic characteristics. This facilitates 
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bonding, mutual trust and confidence that give them a sense of strong 
feelings of working together. 
Each group elects a chairperson, who performs the leadership role 
in the group, and a secretary, who assists the group in many organizational 
activities like book-keeping. Members gather once in a week for group 
meetings where they share their experience and learn and discuss the rules 
of Grameen Bank's group lending programme. In a village five to eight 
groups are collated as a centre. A centre is led by an elected chairperson 
and secretary. Each centre is also assisted by a Grameen Bank employee, 
who visits several groups on a weekly basis. All transactions are openly 
conducted at the centre meeting. These peer monitoring and peer 
mentoring mechanisms work at the level of the group and at the centre 
levels. The Grameen Bank credit delivery system has the following 
features: 
There is an exclusive focus on the poorest of the poor 
Borrowers are organized into small homogenous groups 
Special loan conditionalities which are particularly suitable for the 
poor 
Simultaneous undertaking of a social development agenda 
addressing basic needs of the clientele 
Design and development of organization and management systems 
capable of delivering programme resources to target clientele 
Expansion of loan portfolio to meet diverse development needs of 
the poor 
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The Grameen Bank considers savings mobilization to be an 
integral part of lending. Each member is required to save at least one taka 
every week, which is deposited in the weekly meeting. In addition, each 
borrower is required to contribute 5 percent of their borrowed amount to 
the group fund. The group fund is self-managed and can be used for 
mutually agreed purposes. In addition to mandatory savings, each member 
can purchase a Grameen equity share worth Taka 100 ($US1.50). 
By the beginning of 2001, the new system, "The Grameen 
Generalized System" or GGS was launched and by April 2002, the 
Grameen Bank II emerged on a full-fledged operational basis. The 
transition was completed on August 7, 2002. The new Grameen Bank II is 
now a real and functioning institution. This second- generation microcredit 
institution appears to be much better equipped than it was in its earlier 
version. In the Grameen Bank II, gone are the general loans, seasonal 
loans, family loans, and more than a dozen other types of loans; gone is 
the group fund; gone is the branch and zone loan ceiling; gone is the fixed-
size weekly installment; gone is the rule to borrow every time for one 
whole year, even when the borrower needed the loan only for three 
months; gone is the high-level tension among the staff and the borrowers 
trying to steer away from the dreadful event of a borrower turning into a 
"defaulter," even when she is still repaying; and gone are many other 
familiar features of the Grameen Classic System. 
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Moreover, the GGS has been built around one prime loan 
product— the Basic Loan. In addition, there are two other loan products: 
1) the housing loan, and 2) the higher education loan which runs parallel 
to the basic loan. All borrowers start with a basic loan. 
One most visible change everybody notices in GGS is the 
disappearance of the Group Fund. The Grameen Bank had had to keep 
defending the Group Fund ever since it was created twenty-five years 
earlier. There are no more joint accounts. Each borrower will have three 
obligatory savings accounts— a) Personal savings account, b) Special 
savings account, and c) Pension deposit account (obligatory only for 
borrowers borrowing above Taka 8,000 (US$ 118). 
The Grameen Bank's microfinance programmes target women 
with the explicit goal of empowering women. The Grameen Bank believes 
that money that goes to women brings more benefits to the family. When 
women borrow, children become immediate beneficiaries. Moreover, 
women have a longer vision and they want to bring changes to their lives 
step by step. The women use money more cautiously and they are 
excellent managers of scares resources. The majority of women receive 
loans for activities that are considered traditionally female activities— 
milch cow, cow fattening, poultry rising, paddy husking, vegetable 
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cultivation and trading, clothing shop, plantation, village phone and so on. 
Therefore, microcredit is working as a liberating force for the poor women 
in the rural area. Nobel Prize Committee notes that "micro-credit proved 
to be an important liberating force in societies where women in particular 
have to struggle against repressive social and economic conditions" 
(Announcement of Nobel Committee 2006). 
The Grameen Bank as the pioneering microfinance institution has 
established the trust in the poor's ability to repay the credit on time, use it 
for self-development and become an agent of socio-economic 
development. The Grameen Bank helped to create a norm of credit 
discipline in the rural poor of Bangladesh. The 98 percent repayment rate 
of the credit has become the gold seal of approval (Dowla 2006). The 
Grameen credit gives high priority to building social capital; this promoted 
through formation of groups and centers, developing leadership quality 
through annual election of group and centre leaders, and electing board 
members when the institution is owned by the borrowers. 
To develop a social agenda owned by the borrowers, something 
similar to the "sixteen decisions," it undertakes a process of intensive 
discussion among the borrowers, and encourages them to take these 
decisions seriously and implement them. Grameen Bank's sixteen 
decisions have established set of norms. The credit delivery model of the 
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bank- group formation, weekly group discussion, group disbursement, 
collection, and centre meetings are the basis of accountability and 
performance (Dowla 2006). 
The Bank also puts special emphasis on the formation of human 
capital and concern for protecting the environment. It monitors children's 
education, and provides scholarships and student loans for higher 
education. For the formation of human capital it makes efforts to bring 
technology such as like mobile phones, and solar power, and promotes 
mechanical power to replace manual power. The microfinance program 
has provided the message to the people of various walks of life that the 
poor have every right to get credit and those poor have proved their credit 
worthiness. The Grameen Bank also established the norm that credit is not 
charity (Dowla 2006). 
Basher (2007) suggests that the Grameen Bank credit program 
helps, (1) to reduce the fertility rate of women in Bangladesh; (2) the 
Grameen Bank helps its borrowers as an agent of economic and social 
development; (3) the Grameen credit program helps to empower the 
women in the rural area of Bangladesh (Basher 2007). The Grameen Bank 
also provides housing loans, education loan to its members. The bank 
encourages members to build homes, plant vegetable gardens, and plant 
trees and install sanitary latrines for a healthy life. In addition, it also train 
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its members in maternal health care, nutrition and child care, family 
planning and public health as well (Hassan 2002). 
Moreover, participation in the credit program increases the 
mobility of the rural women from purchasing power to household 
decisions and their ownership of property. Grameen Bank micro finance is 
empowering the rural poor of Bangladesh (Hashemi et al. 1996). 
Therefore, in addition to economic self-sufficiency, the microfinance 
encourages control over resources, changes in attitudes and decision 
making, changing parental preference for male children, self-confidence, 
decision regarding the child's education; women are in the process of 
empowering themselves. 
5.3: Growth and Performance of the Grameen Bank 
The growth of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has been 
tremendous; it has now around 7 million borrowers, and the proportion of 
female clients increased from 20 per cent in 1976 to 98 per cent in 2007. 
Grameen Bank over the years has made a number of operational changes 
(Hassan 2002; Zaman 2004). Initially it included both male and females in 
a group and then separated the male and female groups. The classical 
Grameen bank model was based on group formation— promotion of thrift 
and after a certain incubation period, extension of credit to the group. 
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The classical Grameen bank model consisted of a bank unit being 
set up with a Field Manager and a number of bank workers, covering an 
area of about 15 to 22 villages. The manager and workers would start by 
visiting villages to familiarize themselves with the local culture in which 
they would be operating and identify prospective clients. They also 
explained the purpose, functions and operations of the bank to the local 
population. Groups of five members are eligible to receive a loan. In the 
first stage, only two out of the five group members are eligible for, and 
receive, a loan. The group is observed for a month to see if the members 
are conforming to the rules of the bank. Only if the first two borrowers 
repay the principal plus interest over a period of fifty weeks do other 
members of the group become eligible for their loan. These restrictions 
provide for substantial peer monitoring and group pressure. 
The collective responsibility of the group serves as collateral for 
the loan. Those borrowers with good repayment records are eligible for 
higher loan amounts and graduate to seasoned borrower status in which 
case they become eligible for individual loans. The Grameen Bank's 
pioneering use of group-lending contracts with joint-liability potentially 
reduces the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in the credit 
market for the poor (Morduch 1999). 
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From the 1980s and the early 1990s, Grameen Bank started to 
expand its credit all over the country (Table 5.1). Loans were made to 
individuals but through small groups under joint-liability. The loans were 
meant for income-generating activity. The collection of the loans was 
frequent— usually weekly. The interest rates charged did not include any 
sort of subsidy and the rates were relatively low (around 20 per cent). The 
fundamental tenet of the Grameen Bank is that the poor are credit worthy 
and the poor always pay back (Dowla and Barua 2006). 
Table 5.1: The Progress of the Grameen Bank (Amount in Million US$) 
Performance indictors 1976 
Cumulative .001 
Disbursement 
Disbursement during .001 
the year 
Total Deposit 
Total Members (in 
millions) 
Percentage of Female 20 
Members 
Profit/ Loss (for the 
year) 
1983 
194.9 
99.3 
18.5 
.06 
46 
-0.0059 
Source: Grameen Bank (www.Grameen-info. 
1990 
248.0 
68.7 
25.9 
0.9 
91 
0.0027 
org) 
1995 
1405.9 
333.2 
117.6 
2.1 
94 
0.4 
2000 
3060.4 
268.4 
126.8 
2.4 
95 
0.21 
2006 
5954.0 
724.9 
633.3 
6.9 
97 
20.00 
2007 
6685.5 
731.5 
758.9 
7.4 
97 
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Chart 5.1: Number of Borrowers of Grameen Bank (1976- 2007) 
Source: Same as in Table 5.1. 
From the mid 1990s, it significantly expanded its outreach and 
activities throughout the county (Table 5.1, 5.2 and also discussed in 
chapter III). The Grameen bank faced significant challenges in the late 
1990s when in 1998, the nation faced a devastating flood, putting two-
thirds of the country under water for eleven weeks. The Grameen bank 
faced repayment problems during this period; 20 per cent of the loans 
became irregular (Dowla and Barua 2006). This forced the bank to rethink 
their business model. Prof. Yunus changed the model in September 2001 
(called Grameen II)- switching from group lending and savings to 
individual lending and savings, merging various loan products into one 
product called the basic loan, and providing temporary reprieve in the 
form of a flexible loan for borrowers having repayment problems. The 
first pronouncement of the change in Grameen II came with the 
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publication of a monograph by Prof. Yunus in April 2002 titled Grameen 
Bank II: Designed to Open New Possibilities. 
Table 5.2: The Grameen Bank— Indicators of Outreach— 2002 - 2007 
Year 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Number of 
Active 
Borrowers 
(in 
Millions) 
2.08 
2.87 
3.70 
5.05 
5.96 
6.16 
Rate of 
Growth 
(%) 
37.98 
28.92 
36.49 
18.02 
3.36 
Total 
Women 
Borrowers 
1.98 
2.73 
3.54 
4.86 
5.76 
5.97 
Rate of 
Growth 
(%) 
37.88 
29.67 
37.29 
18.52 
3.65 
Share of 
women 
in total 
borrower 
s 
95.20 
95.44 
95.66 
96.27 
96.70 
96.85 
Number 
of 
Deposito 
rs (in 
millions) 
1.48 
3.12 
4.06 
5.58 
6.91 
7.41 
Rate of 
Growth 
(%) 
110.8 
30.13 
37.44 
23.84 
7.24 
Source: Same as in Table 5.1. 
At the present level of disbursement and loans outstanding, the GB 
is operating without a financial subsidy. In addition, the present level of 
disbursement and outstanding loan has increased its growth in assets and 
loan portfolio significantly (Table 5.3) 
Table 5.3: The Grameen Bank—Growth in Assets and Loan Portfolio— 
2002-2007 
Year 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
us$ 
Assets 
In million 
dollars 
315.70 
394.03 
514.71 
633.02 
819.79 
941.27 
Rate of 
Growth (%) 
28.81 
30.63 
22.99 
29.50 
14.82 
us$ 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
213.34 
268.03 
337.70 
424.47 
482.08 
532.04 
Rate of 
Growth (%) 
25.64 
25.99 
25.69 
13.57 
10.36 
Source: Same as in Table 5.1. 
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The bank diversified its program from credit to insurance and other 
types of loans such as educational loans. Moreover, from the mid 1990s, it 
established eleven sister organizations that range from profit organizations 
to not-for-profit organizations (discussed in this chapter in 5.3.1). These 
sister organizations provided support in Grameen's mission of poverty 
alleviation of the rural poor. 
The growth of the Grameen Bank started in the 1990s and applies 
to both borrowers and assets. The Grameen Bank is not taking any subsidy 
or aid from the donors. This discussion reveals that the Grameen Bank's 
growth of borrowers, outstanding loan, assets and profitability has 
confirmed it as a profitable micro finance institution. Given its operational 
costs and financial performance, the Grameen Bank is a financially viable 
microfinance institution. 
5.3.1: Grameen Bank's Family Organizations 
The Grameen Bank has twelve family organizations (subsidiaries) 
which are equally responsible for helping the rural poor of Bangladesh in 
various ways. The Grameen Bank family organizations are Grameen 
Communications, Grameen Trust, Grameen Fund, Grameen Telecom, 
Grameen Cybernet Limited, Grameen Shakti/Energy, Grameen Phone, 
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Grameen Shikkha/Education, Grameen Knitwear Limited, Grameen 
Solutions, and Grameen Byabosa Bikash (business promotion services). 
Grameen Communications: Grameen Communication is a not-for-profit 
Grameen Telecom Company, established in 1997. Its main goal is 
developing software, hardware, networking, IT services and IT education. 
Grameen Trust: Grameen Trust was introduced in 1989 to support and 
promote a GB type program that works for poverty alleviation. It builds 
networks, publishes materials, and provides technical support to national 
and international organizations for GB replication initiatives. 
Grameen Fund: Not-for-profit sister organization of GB was founded in 
1994. It provides finance to ventures that are risky, technology-oriented 
and otherwise deprived of finances from existing formal lending 
institutions. 
Grameen Telecom: Grameen Telecom was established in 1995 as a sister 
organization of GB to provide easy access to telephone services all over 
rural Bangladesh. 
Grameen Cybernets Ltd.: Grameen cybernet was established in 1996 to 
provide internet services in Bangladesh. 
Grameen Shakti/Energy: Not-for-profit sister organization of GB 
established in 1996. It is a rural power company to empower the rural 
people with access to green energy and income. It supplies renewable 
energy to unelectrified villages in Bangladesh. 
Grameen Phone: A profit based sister organization of Gameen Bank 
established in 1997 to provide cellular phone services. 
Grameen Shikkha/Education: Grameen Education was established in 
1997 to promote mass education in rural areas, provide financial support 
in the form of loans and grants for the purpose of education. 
Grameen Knitwear Limited: Established in 1997, it is an export oriented 
knitwear company. 
Grameen Solutions: A software development company. Moreover, it 
provides solution services for the businesses, technology fields 
Grameen Byabosa Bikas (business promotion services): A not-for-profit 
business promotion services organization established in 2001 as sister 
organization of GB. Its strategy is to make resources and scope available 
to the poor (farmers/producers) entrepreneurs through technical, financial, 
and marketing support. 
The wide variety of subsidiaries that Grameen set up has provided 
for a diversified asset base and provided revenue from multiple sources 
(assets) which then formed as a corpus for many of its charitable activities. 
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Grameen Bank not only expanded its credit programs but also a wide 
variety of services to the poor. As a result, the poor receive products and 
services at an affordable price that leads the opportunity to scaling up 
services as well. 
5. 4: Corporate Governance of the Grameen Bank 
Governance is about achieving corporate goals. In the case of 
Grameen Bank it has dual missions— called the "double bottom line" 
(Tulchin 2003). It has to serve the poor through financial inclusion (social 
benefits) and at the same time be financially sustainable. The social 
impacts can be assessed in terms of outreach variables such as (a) number 
of borrowers covered, (b) share of women in total outreach, (c) magnitude 
of assets and (d) magnitude of loan extended. Similarly, financial 
sustainability can be assessed in terms of overall profitability through 
measures such as (a) return on equity (ROE), (b) return on assets (ROA), 
(c) gross portfolio yield and (d) operational cost (Christen 2001). We 
present such an analysis in the following paragraphs. 
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the number of borrowers 
covered by Grameen bank is around 7 million in 2007 of on nearly 97 
percent are women (Table 5.2).The rate of increase in outreach 
(borrowers) averaged between 3 to 38 per cent between 2002 and 2007. 
There were more than 7 million depositors by 2007. The assets of the 
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Grameen Bank stood at US $ 941 million at the end of 2007; nearly 56 per 
cent of the assets were in the form of a loan portfolio (Table 5.3). 
The Grameen Bank has been financially successful. With a 
repayment record as high as 98 per cent, the return on equity varied 
between 1 per cent and 22 per cent between 2002 and 2007 (Table 5.4). 
The return on assets (ROA) has been positive and in some years (2005 and 
2006) was as high as 2.5 per cent, which is impressive given the average 
return of banks internationally of one per cent. The yield on return on its 
gross portfolio was as high as 20 per cent (Table 5.5). The proportion of 
default (impaired) assets is very low— around 2 per cent. The operating 
expenses to loan portfolio has been low (around 9 to 13 per cent). 
Table 5.4: The Grameen Bank— Financial Performance—2002- 07 
Year 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Capital/Asset 
10.81% 
9.12% 
15.37% 
11.25% 
10.81% 
9.12% 
Debt to 
Equity 
8.25 
9.96 
5.51 
7.89 
8.25 
9.96 
Return on 
Assets 
0.11% 
0.19% 
2.41% 
2.46% 
0.11% 
Return on 
Equity 
1.07% 
1.07% 
18.40% 
22.37% 
1.07% 
Source: Same as in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.5: The Grameen Bank— Operating Performance— 2002-07 
Year 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Yield on 
Gross 
Portfolio 
20.31% 
-
22.43% 
22.94% 
20.31% 
Provision for 
Loan 
Impairment/ 
Assets 
2.23% 
1.81% 
0.44% 
1.50% 
2.23% 
Operating 
Expense/ 
Assets 
7.33% 
6.19% 
8.35% 
6.97% 
7.33% 
Operating 
Expense/Loan 
Portfolio 
12.72% 
9.29% 
12.57% 
11.17% 
12.72% 
Source: Same as in Table 5.1. 
Considering the good economic performance and outreach, it 
would be interesting to examine its links with other elements of corporate 
governance. 
5.4.1: Corporate Governance Literature and Governance of the 
Grameen Bank 
In terms of analytical framework, we use the stakeholder model of 
corporate governance as the basis for analytical and empirical analysis (as 
discussed in chapter II). As outlined in chapter II, the evaluation of 
corporate governance of Grameen Bank is conducted on (a) board 
characteristics, size, etc., and (b) Auditor independence. 
From 1976, the Grameen Bank was a project directed by Prof. 
Mohammed Yunus and the central bank of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank) 
along with international donors. There was no board or council to oversee 
its functioning. In 1983, a board was constituted by the government with 
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only government nominees. In 1996, through an amendment, the board 
size was expended to 13, of which nine were to be elected from 
borrowers/shareholders and other four members (two general members, 
Chairman of the Board and Managing Director-CEO) were appointed by 
the government. 
The board of directors is the body that oversees the management of 
the Grameen Bank (from 1983). As elected representatives of the 
stakeholders, the directors are obligated to ensure that managers protect 
the interests of the stakeholders— in the case of the Grameen Bank they 
could be identified as borrowers (who own 90 per cent of the equity), 
government (who own the remaining 10 per cent), donors, and regulators 
(like PKSF and central bank). The independence of the board and its 
effectiveness are important attributes crucial to the functioning of the 
Grameen Bank. If a board has more outsiders (other than managers), it is 
considered to be more independent. Bhagat and Black (1997) reported 
that 50 percent of the 100 American public corporations surveyed in 1996 
had only one or two inside directors (cited in John and Senbet 1998). 
It has also been suggested that boards dominated by outsider 
(independent) or non-executive directors may help to reduce agency 
problems (Berle and Means 1932; Wiliamson 1985; and Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). Such boards may help in reducing management 
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consumption and removing non-performing CEOs and other personnel 
(Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Pearce and Zahra (1992) argue that if the 
majority of board members are outsiders, then their deliberations and 
decisions provide better strategic directions which ultimately improve 
performance (cited in Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). 
The Grameen Bank is a specialized village bank for lending to the 
poor. Borrowers of the bank own 90 percent of its share capital and 10 
percent of its share capital is owned by the government of Bangladesh. 
The government, which owns 10 per cent of the share capital of Grameen 
Bank, appoints the CEO and Chairman of the Board of the Grameen Bank 
and has a greater voice in the day-to-day functioning of the bank. Thus, a 
minority shareholder (government) is able to control the appointment of 
CEO, Chairman of the Board of Grameen Bank and thereby the 
functioning of the bank. 
Even though a majority of board members are outsiders 
(stakeholders), the government in terms of its control over supply of 
capital (through BB) and regulatory power (through Bangladesh bank) is 
able to vest itself in control of the Grameen Bank. Hence the board of the 
Grameen bank is subservient to the government. As long as Dr. 
Mohammed Yunus is the moving spirit behind the organization, Grameen 
Bank may be able to minimize the intrusive behavior of the government. 
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The Grameen Bank board is composed of outside board members. 
Out of 13 board members, the managing director of the bank is the only 
insider in the board. In the Grameen Bank, 9 out of 13 board members are 
the borrowers/shareholders on the board. Most of them are hardly literate 
and have little formal education; they could be overwhelmed by 
government nominees or managers. On the contrary, most of the 
government representatives are graduates of from universities and 
professional institutions and management schools. 
Almost all the outside board members are women borrowers. Thus 
in theory, outsiders dominate the board of Grameen Bank; in reality they 
may not have a 'real voice' as these outside board members (women 
borrowers) may not have the knowledge, expertise in board conduct. They 
could easily be influenced or cajoled into submission by powerful insiders. 
Therefore, they may not be able to follow the proceedings of the board and 
contribute to a good and effective board. A high fraction of women 
borrowers on the board could help the Grameen bank to understand their 
customers better and that could prevent the mission drift. However, most 
of the office bearers (including the CEO) are men. It is paradoxical that a 
bank with an almost exclusive focus on women clientele allows them very 
little influence at the operational level. 
The second issue related to board performance is the size of the 
board of the Grameen bank. A board with fewer members could improve 
93 
the decision-making process and efficiency of the board. Literature 
suggests that a small board would be better for effective monitoring of the 
management and CEO (Fama and Jensen 1983; Kim and Nofsinger 2007; 
John and Senbet 1998). The empirical evidence from the study of Monks 
and Minow (1995) suggest that the size of board does matter (cited in 
Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that small 
board may be more effective, recommending a board of eight or nine 
members (cited in Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). An empirical study of a 
sample of 792 companies by Yermack (1996) suggests that a smaller 
board brings better performance. 
The Grameen Bank has a board size of 13 which is relatively large 
by corporate board standards. The 1983 Grameen Bank ordinance 
stipulates a board of governors composed of the chairman, the managing 
director, and nine other members— five appointed by the government of 
Bangladesh and four appointed by the borrower-shareholders. The 1983 
board was essentially dominated by the government nominees. However, 
the 1986 amendment of the ordinance provides for 13 members of the 
board, of which nine are to be elected members from the borrowers/ 
shareholders and the other four members (two general members, chairman 
and managing director) are selected by the Bangladesh government. The 
Grameen Bank board members are elected every year and the board 
members are eligible for re-election to the board. 
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For electing the board members form the borrowers, the Grameen 
Bank has divided the whole coverage area into nine electoral areas. From 
each of the electoral area one board member is elected by the borrowers of 
the Grameen Bank. The election process starts from the group level and 
then goes up to the electoral areas through centre, branch, area, and zone. 
The Grameen Bank board meetings are held four times per year. However, 
in case of emergency or need, meetings can be held more than four times 
in a given year. The Board is assisted by various committees of the Board 
for various aspects of decision making (like human resources, overseas 
operation, etc.). 
On the other hand, Pfeffer (1987), Pearce and Zahra (1992), and 
Goodstein et al. (1994) argue that a bigger board may be effective because 
members will bring diverse opinion and resources which may eventually 
reduce environmental uncertainties (cited in Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). It 
may be appropriate to have a larger board for the Grameen Bank, because 
almost all of the outside board members are the borrowers/members of 
Grameen Bank. Therefore, a larger board composed of various experts 
will bring critical resources for the bank, which will be helpful for good 
and effective governance. 
95 
Another important variable crucial to the governance mechanism is 
the independence of the auditor. The internal auditor oversees the firm's 
financial and operating procedures, checks the accuracy of the financial 
record keeping, and ensures compliance with accounting regulations (Kim 
and Nofsinger 2007). The internal board auditor provides independent, 
objective assessment of the organization's internal governance structure 
and the operating effectiveness of management of MFIs (Mersland and 
Storm 2009). Policy papers regarding the MFIs stress the internal auditor's 
independence and to report directly to the MFI board (Steinwand, 2000). 
A study by Mersland and Storm (2009) show that MFIs are reporting 
directly to the board shows higher financial performance. 
The Grameen Bank board has several sub-committees that are 
chaired by members of board; an audit committee, finance committee, 
budget committee, and planning and evaluation committee. At the same 
time, the Grameen Bank has an internal auditor who report directly to the 
board. Corporate governance stresses the importance of internal audit and 
recommends that the internal auditor reports directly to the board. Thus, 
an MFI allowing its internal auditors to report directly to the board should 
show higher financial performance. The present study found that Grameen 
Bank sent the audit report directly to the board. Moreover, it has external 
independent auditor and its report is published regularly and posted on its 
website regularly. In addition, it publishes its financial report regularly. 
5.5: Conclusion 
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The corporate governance structure along with its business model 
of the Grameen Bank is widely emulated worldwide and is often cited as a 
model code for other MFIs. Essentially, the corporate governance 
structure of the Grameen Bank is based on the stakeholder value 
maximization model. The majority of the board members (9 out of 13) are 
from the borrower groups— the biggest stakeholder of the bank. However, 
most of the representatives of the borrowers (mostly women) possess very 
little education so as to function effectively and independently in a board 
setting. The government, which regulates and provides capital to the 
Grameen Bank (indirectly through nationalized bank and Bangladesh 
Bank), controls the appointment of the CEO and the Chairman of the 
Board of the Grameen Bank although it is a minority shareholder (10 per 
cent of the equity). Thus, the board of the Grameen Bank is compliant 
with the government and lacks the independent character which is crucial 
to the conduct and performance of the bank. 
At present, the Grameen Bank is dependent on the tremendous 
clout and goodwill of Professor Mohammed Yunus (founder of the bank) 
in preventing potential abuses by the government and also in attracting 
capital worldwide (from various governments and NGOs). The question of 
how the bank will be able to function in the absence of its founder is a 
serious one. On the positive side, the Grameen Bank possesses 
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independent auditors (internal and external) who report to the board 
directly. This positive aspect is overshadowed the dominance of the 
government in the vital decision-making of the bank. 
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Chapter VI: 
Corporate Governance and Microfinance Institutions 
(MFIs) Performance in Bangladesh— Empirical Results 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical investigation and 
is organized as follows. Section 1 presents basic statistics of the data used 
in the empirical investigation, while Section 2 presents the results of the 
empirical investigation. Section 3 summarizes the main conclusions. 
Section 6.1 
Summary Statistics 
The average asset size of MFIs in Bangladesh used in the study is 
US$24 million. However, the median size is only US$2.8 million, which 
indicates that there is considerable variation in the firm size among the 
MFIs in Bangladesh used in the study (Table 6.1). The lowest size of asset 
size in the study is US$0.03 million while the largest firm has a total asset 
size of US$619 million. The standard deviation of total assets of MFI's in 
Bangladesh is high (US$102 million). In general, the total asset size 
variable is positively skewed (skewness= 5.63). Similarly, the number of 
borrowers of MFIs, which is an alternative measure of size, is also highly 
skewed. The lowest number of borrowers among the MFIs was 458 and 
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the largest one has 4.5 million borrowers; the median number of borrowers 
was 1.9 million. 
The average return on assets (ROA) is 2.25 per cent with the 
median value lower at 2.13. The lowest ROA was -13.84 while for MFIs 
with the highest ROA it was 11.13. Unlike total assets ROA is negatively 
skewed (-1.07 per cent). 
Table 6.1: Basic Descriptive Statistics 
Basic Statistics 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Deviation 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Observations 
ROA 
2.25 
2.13 
4.48 
-1.07 
24.97 
-13.84 
11.13 
36 
Total Assets 
24,558,834 
2,852,311 
102,644,049 
5.63 
619,365,159 
34,379 
619,399,538 
36 
No. of 
Borrowers 
187,378 
27,663 
754,323 
32.90 
458 
4,550,855 
36 
Duml 
0.88 
1.00 
0.32 
-2.47 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
36 
Dum2 
0.44 
0.00 
0.50 
0.22 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
36 
Dum3 
0.19 
0.00 
0.40 
1.54 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
36 
Chart 6.1 and 6.2 reports the box plot (which presents graphical 
plot of variations in data like quartile 1, quartile 2, quartile 3 and range) of 
the MFI data used in the empirical investigation. As is evident, the size of 
the firms (total assets and number of borrowers) show significant variation 
(Chart 6.2) 
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Chart 6.1: Box Plot of Return on Assets of MFIs in Bangladesh— 2008 
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Chart 6.2: Box Plot of Total Assets and Borrowers of MFI's in Bangladesh—2008 
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Section 6.2: 
Cross-Sectional Results 
Table 6.2 summarizes the results of the cross-section regression 
results based on ordinary least squares based on the following equation 
ROA = ao + ailog (TA) „ + 012 (Auditor Independence Dummy) ,t + a3 
Board Composition Dummy
 lt + Board Size Dummy l t + e l t 
(6.1) 
Table 6.2: Determinants of Performance of MFI's in Bangladesh— 
Dependent Variables— ROA - 2008 
ROA ROA 
Constant 
Log (Total Assets) 
Log(Borrowers) 
Auditor independence (Dummy 1) 
Board Composition (Dummy2) 
Board Size (Dummy3) 
Number of Observations 36 
Diagnostics 
R Square 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 
F- Value 
Note: 1. Figures in brackets are 't'-values. 
2. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
7.01 
(1.61) 
-0.50 
(-1.77)* 
-0.71 
(-0.39) 
6.62 
(5.16)* 
0.55 
(0.38) 
5.12 
(1.53) 
-0.53 
(-1.82)*** 
-0.66 
(-0.36) 
6.45 
(5.21)* 
0.56 
(0.38) 
0.48 
2.1 
7.14 
0.48 
2.2 
7.2 
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The ROA equation (equation 6.1) shows that the corporate 
governance variable- board composition (dummy2) has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on MFI performance in Bangladesh. The 
board composition variable captures the impact of the number of 
independent directors (outsiders) relative to insiders (managers); MFIs 
with independent board (number of independent directors > insiders) have 
a positive impact on MFI performance. These results are corroborated 
with the regression results where the size variable is the number of 
borrowers as well. Other corporate governance variables like board size 
and auditor independence are not statistically significant. The overall 
explanatory power of the equation is relatively good (R = 0.48). 
Section 6.3 
Conclusion 
The empirical results reported in this chapter show that corporate 
governance variables are important in explaining the performance of 
MFI's in Bangladesh. Among the corporate governance variables, the 
board composition variable reflecting the independence of the board 
seems to have a positive and significant impact on the performance of 
MFI's in Bangladesh. The absence of statistical significance for the other 
corporate governance variables like auditor independence can be attributed 
to lack of clarity regarding these. For example, almost all of the MFIs 
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report that the auditors are independent. However, a careful scan of these 
data and checking into other information shows that the auditors may be 
related to the CEO in one way or another. 
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Chapter VII: 
Concluding Observations 
The microfinance programme initiated by the Grameen Bank has 
become a model of lending to the poor world-wide and is now part of the 
global anti-poverty strategy. Bangladesh has the highest MFI density and 
has now become a model of outreach to the poor worldwide. Given the 
fact that MFIs have to tread a fine path between profits and social 
outcomes, the future expansion of the microfinance sector hinges on 
among other things, the integrity and credibility of the industry. In this 
regard a study of the corporate governance of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) in Bangladesh is appropriate. This study is the first step in this 
direction. 
The microfinance institutions (MFIs) operate under different 
institutional frameworks, providing financial and non-financial services to 
the poor. However, three MFIs (BRAC, ASA and Proshika) and Grameen 
Bank share almost eighty percent of the micro-credit in this sector. Most 
of the NGOs-MFIs in Bangladesh are registered with the Societies 
Registration Act of 1860. Registering with this law is very simple and no 
distinction is made on whether or not the society is maintaining any audit 
or accounts. In addition, there are a few other NGO-MFIs reporting laws, 
not sufficient to provide supervisory and regulatory environment for MFIs 
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in Bangladesh. For this, the Government of Bangladesh passed a law in 
2006 that created the Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), which 
will recommend relevant laws and regulations and provide licenses to all 
the MFIs. Without the MRA license, MFIs are not allowed to deliver 
microcredit in Bangladesh. 
For its part, the Grameen Bank has been financially successful. 
With a repayment record as high as 98 per cent, the return on equity varied 
between 1 and 22 per cent between 2002 and 2007 which far exceeds the 
return of the formal banking system worldwide. The return on assets 
(ROA) has also been positive and in some years (2005 and 2006) was as 
high as 2.5 per cent which is impressive given the average return of banks 
internationally of one per cent. The yield on return on its gross portfolio 
was as high as 20 per cent. The proportion of default (impaired) assets is 
very low— around 2 per cent. The operating expenses of the loan portfolio 
have been low (around 9 to 13 per cent). Considering the good economic 
performance and outreach, this bank's elements of corporate governance 
have been studied on the basis of the analytical framework provided in 
chapter 4. 
The MFIs in Bangladesh expanded in the 1990s and one-third of 
MFIs joined the industry from 2000 onward. However, the MFI's product 
market in Bangladesh is very competitive. At the same time the 
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overlapping of customers is increasing rapidly and there are increasing 
concerns about borrowers having multiple memberships which could lead 
to over-indebtedness of borrowers. This situation is aggravated by the fact 
that the MFIs are not regulated yet, but the process is ongoing. Moreover, 
the MFIs are following the rules of financial transparency as a process of 
regulation. 
Although the NGO-MFIs are broadly following the corporate 
governance structure, however, the chief executives are said to overpower 
the boards. Because of the chief executive selects the members of general 
body, it is possible that like-minded people and friends will become 
members of the general body of MFIs. If this is the situation, good 
governance will not occur by just inducting good people in the governing 
body. Moreover, the essence of governance is to ensure an overall system 
of structuring accountability and transparency in an organization. The 
governance problems of NGO-MFIs are mostly due to the inadequacy of 
the existing laws and regulations, and the lack of reporting, supervision 
and monitoring in Bangladesh. 
One of the innovations in microfinance has been the targeting of 
female customers. In case of the sample of 36 MFIs, more than 90 percent 
of the members/borrowers are women. Presumably, having a female CEO 
or a high representation of women in the board could help the MFIs to 
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understand their customers better, and that would eliminate the risks. Our 
empirical investigation found results to the contrary: most of the board 
members and CEOs of MFIs are male and men dominate the boards of 
MFIs where almost all of their clients are women. 
The Grameen Bank's governance is based on the stakeholder value 
maximization model. The majority of the board members (9 out of 13) are 
from the borrower groups - the biggest stakeholder of the bank. The board 
of Grameen Bank is independent. However, most of the representatives of 
the borrowers (usually women) possess very little education needed to 
function effectively and independently in a board setting. The government 
that regulates and provides capital to the Grameen Bank (indirectly 
through Bangladesh Bank) controls the appointment of the CEO and the 
Chairman of the Board of the Grameen Bank although it is a minority 
shareholder (10 per cent of the equity). Thus, the board of the Grameen 
Bank may lack the independent character which is crucial to the conduct 
and performance of the bank. At present, the Grameen Bank is dependent 
on the tremendous clout and goodwill of Professor Mohammed Yunus 
(founder of the bank) to prevent potential abuses by the government and 
also to attracting capital worldwide (from various governments and 
NGOs). The question of how the bank will be able to function in the 
absence of its founder is a serious one. On the positive side, the Grameen 
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Bank possesses independent auditors (internal and external) who report to 
the board directly. 
The empirical results reported in Chapter 6 clearly show that 
corporate governance variables are significant in explaining the 
performance of MFI's in Bangladesh. Among the corporate governance 
variables, the board composition variable, reflecting the independence of 
the board, seems to have a positive and significant impact on the 
performance of MFI's in Bangladesh. 
The microfinance industry in Bangladesh is in the consolidation 
phase: big MFIs and the Grameen Bank account for more than two-thirds 
of the clientele. In recent years, with the entry of commercially-oriented 
MFIs, there is a need to strengthen the governance and supervision of 
MFIs in Bangladesh. Although the Grameen Bank is under the direct 
supervision of the Bangladesh Bank, other MFIs have only recently been 
brought under the umbrella of supervision. Secondly, with MFIs offering 
not only savings services but other elements like insurance, pension 
products, mobile phones, etc., a co-ordinated and consolidated supervision 
is called for to prevent regulatory arbitrage. 
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